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Abstract 
The focus of this study deals with the vacation ownership, or timeshare, industry, 
and is two-fold. First, it examines the passage of a criminal law in Florida that deals with 
the resale of timeshare properties and measures the law’s effects on the timeshare 
industry in terms of shareholder wealth. Second, the study examines the effect of the 
announcement of the sale of asset-backed securities in the timeshare industry, also in 
terms of shareholder wealth. The cumulative abnormal returns of publicly traded lodging 
corporations that operate in the timeshare industry are calculated and analyzed for both 
studies.   
The passage of Florida’s Timeshare Resale Accountability Act had a somewhat of 
a significant, positive effect on the shareholder wealth of lodging firms, specifically 
centering around the date the law became enforceable, which was July 1, 2012, while 
other key dates in the legislative process had mixed results. 
 The impact of mortgage-backed securitization announcements of lodging firms 
that have timeshare operations had significant, positive effects on the shareholder wealth 
of these firms as well.   
 While similar event studies have been performed in the lodging sector, there is a 
paucity of event study research in the vacation ownership industry.  This research focuses 
on the impact of changes in the state of Florida that effect the timeshare resale market and 
also the impact that the securitization of mortgage-backed securities has on the 
shareholder wealth of lodging firms that have timeshare operations.     
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
During the Great Recession of 2008, many timeshare owners found themselves in 
dire financial straits, unable to continue paying for their units. Accordingly, the timeshare 
industry’s resale market experienced a deluge of owners seeking to sell their timeshare 
units, usually at discounted prices.  Many of these owners became the victims of 
fraudulent timeshare resale brokers. A Florida state law, the Timeshare Resale 
Accountability Act, was passed to deal with these fraudulent operators in 2012.  The first 
section of this study examines the impact of the enactment of this Florida law on the 
shareholder wealth of timeshare companies in the U.S., as well as traditional hotel 
companies that operate a timeshare business. 
 The second section of this study deals with the securitizations of mortgage-backed 
securities issued by timeshare companies and traditional hotel companies that operate a 
timeshare business. An example of a traditional hotel company that operates a significant 
timeshare business is Wyndham Worldwide.   
Figure 1 illustrates how much of a contribution some of the major vacation ownership 
firms have in the revenue they generate for their parent corporations.  It is of note to point 
out that Marriott International (NASDAQ, MAR) “spun off” its timeshare business to 
become an independent entity that is publicly traded (NASDAQ, VAC).  
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Figure 1.  Major public operator’s timeshare related revenue ($ millions).  Adapted from 
Timeshare Market Update & Capital IQ 
 
The Great Recession also took its toll on vacation ownership corporations as 
lenders tightened credit instruments as sales plummeted from an historic high of $10.6 
billion in 2007 to $6.3 billion in 2009 (see Figure 2).  The majority of timeshare 
consumers put very little money, or even no money, as a down payment on a timeshare 
unit purchase, and ends up with a mortgage rate sometimes reaching over 15% (Murphy, 
2008b). 
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Figure 2. Timeshare sales volume 2005-2012 (amounts in billions).  Adapted from 2013 
State of the Vacation Timeshare Industry, United States Study 2013 Edition, American 
Resort Development Association International Foundation. 
 
 
Nabawanuka and Lee (2009) studied the relationship between timeshare operations 
within larger, traditional hotel corporations in terms of firm value, accounting 
performance, and firm risk. The authors found the existence of an “inverted U-shape” 
relationship between the degree of timeshare operation and the firm value and of the 
parent lodging firm, which suggests that there is an advantage for a traditional lodging 
firm to invest in the timeshare product/concept up to a certain point.  The “inverted U-
shape” relationship also suggests, however, that there exists an optimal level of 
investment into timeshare products by the parent firm (Nabawanuka & Lee, 2009).   
Their study also concluded that there existed a U-shaped relationship with timeshare 
operations and a firm’s accounting performance.  This suggested that as a firm increases 
its timeshare operations, its accounting performance decreases, but only to a certain 
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point, and then stabilizes and has no positive or negative impact on accounting 
performance (Nabawanuka & Lee, 2009). Lastly, the study found that the degree of a 
firm’s timeshare operations had no significant impact on firm risk (Nabawanuka & Lee, 
2009).  The authors point out, however, that although their study found no direct 
relationship between a firm’s degree of timeshare investment and operational capacity, 
the market generally believes that a timeshare component in a business mix is perceived 
as a value-added strategy (Nabawanuka & Lee, 2009). 
 This study focuses on the stock performance of publicly traded vacation 
ownership corporations, including lodging corporations that have vacation ownership 
operations, which are affected by changes in Florida state law.  Vacation ownership 
companies are also affected by the announcement of securitization transactions and will 
be evaluated by way of event study analyses.   While event studies have been performed 
in the lodging sector (Canina, 2001; Kwansa, 1994), little has been done in the vacation 
ownership (timeshare) industry, especially in the areas of the impact of regulatory 
changes (in this case a new criminal law passed in Florida relating to the secondary 
timeshare market) and securitization announcements of mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) by vacation ownership corporations (or more appropriately, lodging firms that 
operate in the vacation ownership industry).   
Changes in Florida timeshare regulations and statutes were chosen because 
Florida has the highest concentration of vacation ownership properties in the United 
States, with 23% of all timeshare units residing in the state, according to the American 
Resort Development Association International Foundation (AIF, 2011).  Any changes in 
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Florida timeshare laws would affect a large portion of each timeshare company’s unit-
inventory.   
Event studies have been performed in a number of industries regarding changes in 
industry regulations or the passage of new laws that affect an industry.  Many studies 
have been conducted on topics such as real estate (Impson & Conover, 2011; Nanda and 
Ross, 2012), financial deregulation (Graddy, Reuben, Strickland, & Bass, 2004), state 
and federal laws and regulations (Ababneh & Tang, 2013), and mergers and acquisitions 
in the hospitality industry (Canina, 2001; Kwansa, 1994), among many others.  The 
vacation ownership industry, in contrast, has yet to be studied in this capacity.   
Research Questions 
The key research questions addressed in this study include: 
1) Do changes in Florida state law regarding the vacation ownership industry 
impact shareholder wealth of lodging firms that operate a vacation ownership business? 
2) Do announcements of successful securitizations by vacation ownership 
business, or that of lodging firms that operate a vacation ownership business, affect 
shareholder wealth of those firms? 
MacKinlay (1997), and Brown and Warner (1985), examined event study 
methodology that is relevant to these research questions.  This study will use the event 
study methodology to analyze timeshare firms in relation to the financial impact on 
shareholder wealth of these firms.  These firms will be broken into two separate event 
classes, the Florida Legislature’s passage of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act of 
2012 and the announcement of successful securitizations by specific timeshare 
corporations for the period 2004 through 2015.  
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Definition of Key Terms 
 Asset Backed Security (ABS), a security that is mainly serviced by cash flows 
or future cash flows from a defined pool of receivables or other asset 
(Morrison, 1993)   
 Asset Pool, financial assets that share similar characteristics such as term 
length, value, credit worthiness (Morrison, 1993) 
 Asymmetric Information, Information that is known to one party or that one 
party is privy to, and another party in a given transaction is not (Iacobucci & 
Winter, 2005) 
 Balance Sheet, a financial accounting statement that illustrates the financial 
condition of a firm at a given point in time. 
 Bankruptcy Remoteness, the repayment of the securities is separated from the 
risk of a default by the originator of the assets (Morrison, 1993). 
 Cash Flow Statement, a financial accounting statement that establishes where 
and when cash is paid and when cash is received. 
 Collateral, a financial asset that is used to secure a loan and will be forfeited 
by the borrower if the loan enters default; in terms of securitizations, cash 
flows may be considered collateral (or expected cash flows) (Lee & Chen, 
1998). 
 Credit Enhancement, the act of embellishing the credit worthiness of a pool or 
pools of securitized loans, also known as liquidity support (Morrison, 1993). 
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 Credit Rating, a specialized notation assigned to the investment quality of 
securities; examples are “investment grade” and “speculative grade” ratings 
(Morrison, 1993). 
 Fee Simple, a vacation ownership product where the buyer is the deeded 
owner of an undivided interest in real property (also known as deeded 
ownership, or interval ownership) (Peters, 1997). 
 Income Statement, a financial accounting statement that measures a 
company’s financial performance over a given period, usually a month, but 
can be shorter or longer term. 
 Issuer, in the context of securitization transactions, an issuer may be the entity 
that offers assets that can be securitized for sale to investors (DBRS, 2012). 
 Lender, an entity that makes funds available with the understanding that said 
funds will be repaid with a given interest rate (DBRS, 2012). 
 Liquidity, the relative ease and time with which cash can be extracted from an 
asset (DBRS, 2012). 
 Mortgage Backed Security (MBS), a financial asset composed of a mortgage 
(in this context a residential or timeshare mortgage, not to be confused with 
commercial mortgage backed securities, or CMBS) that is pooled with other 
mortgages and assigned an investment worthiness grade in a securitization 
transaction (Peters, 1997). 
 Right-to-Use Timeshare Product, a vacation ownership product, whereas a 
buyer’s ownership is considered non-equity and the title remains with the 
developer of the resort or property (Peters, 1997). 
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 Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or Special Purpose Entity (SPE), a special 
type of trust that the issuer (or originator in some instances) of an offering of a 
pool of asset backed securities or mortgage backed securities creates in order 
to offer the pooled securities to the investing public (Kyle & Kosiba, 2005). 
 Tranche, a pool of assets (usually known as collateral) that is divided into 
smaller portions and categorized by the credit worthiness of the underlying 
cash receivables in a securitization transaction (Lee & Chen, 1998). 
Organization of Dissertation 
 This paper is organized into three chapters that develop a research study proposal, 
to be followed by two additional chapters when the empirical study is complete.  Chapter 
1 introduces the two event sets that are to be studied.  Chapter 2 discusses the literature 
associated with 1) the vacation ownership industry (also known as the timeshare 
industry), 2) the timeshare resale market, 3) the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act, 4) 
securitization of mortgage-backed securities (also may be referred to as asset-backed 
securities in some contexts), 5) event study literature.  Chapter 3 discusses the 
methodology that will be used in this study, the events that will be studied, and different 
methods of event study procedures.   
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
During the Great Recession of 2008, many timeshare owners found themselves in 
dire financial straits, unable to continue paying for their units. Accordingly, the timeshare 
industry’s resale market experienced a deluge of owners seeking to sell their timeshare 
units, usually at discounted prices.  Many of these owners became the victims of 
fraudulent timeshare resale brokers. A Florida state law, the Timeshare Resale 
Accountability Act (H.B. 1001), was enacted to deal with these fraudulent operators in 
2012.  This study examines the impact of the enactment of this Florida law on the 
shareholder wealth of timeshare companies in the U.S.   
The Great Recession also affected the vacation ownership companies who for so 
long had relied on the relatively easy monetization of purchasers’ debt by securitizing 
such debt.  Because the Great Recession, lenders made it much more difficult for 
vacation ownership firms to sell off their customers’ mortgages (Kirby, 2009).  This 
study also addresses the effect of securitization announcements on the shareholder wealth 
of timeshare firms.   
Overview of the Timeshare Industry 
The vacation ownership industry, also known more widely as the timeshare 
industry, originally came into existence in Europe before reaching the United States in 
the 1970s (Woods, 2001). The concept of the timeshare vacation itself is purported to 
come originally from France in the mid-1960s when a small group of people came up 
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with the idea of combining their funds to purchase a villa together, at Superdevoluy, 
which they would all share at various times (Hovey, 2002; Upchurch, 2002).  
During the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the timeshare concept began to 
make its way to other western European countries, North America, South America, 
Australia, and parts of Asia.  But, it was in the the United States, and specifically in the 
state of Florida (Ziobrowski & Ziobrowski, 1997), that the timeshare industry 
experienced exceptional growth and was labeled as the fastest growing segment in 
hospitality (Woods, 2001). Generating revenues of $9.4 billion in 2006, with average 
annual occupancy rates topping 80%, the vacation ownership industry experienced higher 
occupancy rates than the U.S. hotel industry (63.4% occupancy) for the same year (AIF, 
2007).  Even during the Great Recession, when sales volume was at its lowest, the 
timeshare industry experienced $6.3 billion in sales in 2009, and has consistently grown 
each year through 2012 (AIF, 2013a).   
The average number of people in a group that travels to and uses a timeshare in 
the United States is 3.8.  This party spends an average of 7.4 nights per vacation at the 
timeshare resort (Rezak, 2002).  Timeshare occupancy rates typically register between 
85% and 95%, which is considerably higher than the 65% to 70% occupancy rates for 
traditional hotels (Rezak, 2002).  Additionally, stays in the resort area where the 
timeshare property is located averaged 3.4 nights per visit during the five years prior to a 
timeshare unit purchase, but then increased to an average of 5.1 nights after a timeshare 
purchase (Rezak, 2002). 
Timeshare vacationers spend about $4.58 billion annually and show a 54% 
increase in visitation frequency to the resort area where their timeshare is located (Rezak, 
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2002).  The timeshare industry also provides substantial benefits to local governments in 
the form of increased jobs, particularly in their local construction and maintenance 
industries, as well as increased tax revenue, U.S. timeshare owners paid over $1.21 
billion on maintenance fees and over $249 million in property taxes each year (Rezak, 
2002). 
The American Resort Development Association (ARDA) International 
Foundation (AIF) estimates that in 2011 alone, timeshare owners and their guests spent 
upwards of $9.3 billion in the U.S. (AIF, 2012).  AIF also estimates that in 2011, all 
combined direct, indirect, and other “fiscal impacts” by the U.S. timeshare industry 
included, $70 billion in consumer and business spending, 493,000 full and part-time 
employment positions, $23 billion in salaries, and over $7.7 billion in tax revenue (AIF, 
2012).   
The vacation ownership industry was comprised of small firms and regional 
companies for decades before large corporations began to see the potential of this 
segment in the mid-1990s and 2000s.  During this time, there was a dramatic increase in 
larger, established traditional hotel and lodging companies investing in the vacation 
ownership segment (Stringam, 2010).  These traditional hotel corporations included well-
known brands such as Hilton, Marriott, Starwood, Wyndham, and Four Seasons 
(Upchurch, Rompf, & Severt, 2006).  Most of these organizations created “spin-off” 
firms that dealt exclusively in the vacation ownership product.  These stalwarts of the 
traditional hotel industry, with their well-regarded reputations and strong brand name 
recognition, brought growth and a much-needed boost in credibility and legitimacy to the 
timeshare industry (Upchurch, 2008).   
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Unlike a traditional hotel/resort, a timeshare property does not need to worry as 
much about operating costs associated with running the property.  This is because the 
guests in a timeshare are, to a large extent, owners in the property, and therefore they pay 
for the operation of the property in the form of management fees (Powanga & Powanga, 
2008).  Operational costs are usually lower in a timeshare property compared to a 
traditional hotel property because the operating body (or homeowner’s association) of a 
timeshare property is almost always a non-profit entity and costs are reduced in the areas 
of housekeeping (as timeshare units are usually cleaned every week rather than every 
night because owners usually stay more than one night) and property administration 
(Hart, 1980).   
Additionally, the timeshare industry is not traditionally susceptible to economic 
turmoil as is the case with the traditional lodging industry, as business transient guests at 
traditional hotels and motels drastically reduce their traveling needs during these periods 
(Powanga & Powanga, 2008).  For example, during the recession of 2001-2002, the 
operating profits of Marriott International Inc. fell by 24%; during this same time period, 
timeshare operating profits increased by 31% and the total timeshare business unit 
contribution to Marriott’s total operating profit increased to 26% (Powanga & Powanga, 
2008).  As traditional lodging firms saw the potential “recession-proof” aspect of 
timeshare resorts, these reputable firms also boosted the consumer’s confidence in 
purchasing a timeshare in the first place, due to the impact of the strength of the brand.  
Industry Structure 
The vacation ownership industry is regarded as one of the most highly regulated 
industries in the nations in which they are located.  This is mostly due to consumer 
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protection issues within the industry (Hovey, 2002).  For a firm to enter the vacation 
ownership industry, many legal and regulatory obstacles must be overcome.  For 
example, Marriott needs to address nearly 50 regulatory and compliance issues depending 
on the situation in which it enters any specific timeshare market (Woods, 2001).   
The timeshare product can be described as having two main forms of 
“ownership,” that is, what the timeshare-purchasing consumer can expect to actually 
own.  One form of ownership is the title, or trust, and the other is what is referred to as a 
“point-based” system (Upchurch & Gruber, 2002).  The title-base product is the older 
product, and the type of ownership that is more widely known to the general public.  In 
this type of timeshare ownership, the consumer purchases an interest in a particular 
accommodation, and the actual title to the accommodation is granted through a deed, for 
a specific period of each year (Ilvento, 1976; Powanga & Powanga, 2008).  This title-
based product offers owners a “fixed-week” or “interval” of time, of ownership in a 
specified condominium at a specified timeshare property. This type of timeshare product 
offering was the most common form of ownership up to the late 1990s (Hovey, 2002).  A 
modified product, known as the “floating week,” was developed to allow owners to use 
their respective weeks at other times during the year (Hovey, 2002).  For those 
individuals who wish to purchase a deeded property, the size and location of the “home 
resort” are the most significant determining factors in the price of a timeshare unit.   
Consumer demand for greater flexibility of timeshare products led to the 
introduction of the “points-based” program, where the owner does not actually purchase a 
specific or floating week, but rather a number of points that are used to schedule time at a 
timeshare resort property (Hovey, 2002).  These points are purchased once and can be 
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added to at any time, thereby allowing the owner to purchase as many points as needed 
for his or her vacationing needs (Upchurch, 2008).  Points are renewed each year and can 
usually be used to pay for other perks that the timeshare company may offer, such as 
cruises, airfare, or payment of housekeeping services in the condominium (Powanga & 
Powanga, 2008).  Additionally, under some contracts these points can be saved or 
“banked” for future use in an upcoming year (Powanga & Powanga, 2008).  The points 
allow the “destination club” member to vacation at any of the properties in the portfolio 
of the company or to stay at a resort outside of the firm’s portfolio through a designated 
network or exchange (Powanga & Powanga, 2008).  There are two major exchange 
companies that handle the majority of interval vacation swaps or exchanges, Resort 
Condominium International (RCI) and Interval International (II).  These firms allow 
timeshare owners around the world to participate in exchanging their fixed-week 
intervals with other owners of fixed-week intervals (DBRS, 2012).  
Maintenance fees are often associated with timeshare ownership, and these fees 
vary according to the type of timeshare unit purchased.  For fixed-week or interval 
owners, these fees relate to the location of the timeshare unit that is actually deeded to the 
owner.  In the case of a points-based ownership program, the owners in the program 
typically pay a set monthly fee.  The timeshare resort developer, the homeowners 
association, and/or an outside management firm who maintains the resort and the cost of 
the property maintenance determine the maintenance fee levied upon the unit owners 
(Powanga & Powanga, 2008).  It does not matter if an owner pays cash for his or her 
timeshare, all owners are obligated to pay fees that cover capital expenditures, taxes, 
resort management costs, insurance, and property maintenance for the resort where the 
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owner’s interest is located (also referred to as the “home resort”) (DBRS, 2012).  These 
fees can be more costly in reality than an owner might originally comprehend 
conceptually.  Murphy (2008a) found that timeshare owners have been known to list their 
timeshare units on auction websites such as EBay for only $1 simply to get out from the 
maintenance fee obligation associated with the ownership of the timeshare unit. 
To make the timeshare more affordable to some potential owners, “biennial” 
ownership is offered by many timeshare companies.  In this type of ownership, the owner 
purchases the right to use an accommodation every other year, usually for a week.  This 
also reduces the maintenance fee burden for the owner as the fee then becomes due every 
other year (Powanga & Powanga, 2008).   
Purchasing a Timeshare Unit 
 Extant studies have tried to determine owner profiles and potential purchasing 
motivations for a person thinking about a timeshare (AIF, 2002; Crotts & Ragatz, 2002). 
Typical timeshare sales transactions involve the use of “in-house” financing offered by 
the timeshare developer to the potential owner (DBRS, 2012).  This becomes very 
important to note when discussing securitizations later in this study.  The timeshare 
developer usually performs initial collection duties as well as services the loan.  This is 
conducted with a promissory note and secured by a mortgage, which is amortized 
(DBRS, 2012).   
Rezak (2002) found that typical timeshare owners are a married couple between 
the ages of 35 and 64 with a household income in excess of $50,000 per year.  Crotts and 
Ragatz (2002) conducted a study geared toward determining the primary traits of 
timeshare purchasers.  They found that individuals were more affluent and educated 
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compared to the surrounding population and purchasers were typically Baby Boomers 
with no live-in children.  They are also most-often repeat purchasers of timeshare units, 
either purchasing more points at a timeshare company or purchasing a completely 
different timeshare from another firm (Crotts & Ragatz, 2002).  The researchers found 
that the main reason these owners chose to purchase a timeshare in the first place was to 
save money on future vacations, which is a hallmark of timeshare sales tactics.  
It is the position of the timeshare industry that timeshare units by themselves 
should not be considered an investment for financial gain, but should rather be considered 
an investment in a lifestyle (Hovey, 2002).  This is important to note because when 
timeshare owners find themselves in financial distress, they may seek to sell their 
timeshare unit and the obligations that come with its ownership.  Indeed, Powanga and 
Powanga (2008) state that the purchase of a timeshare unit as an investment property is 
not a sound business practice since the retail price is escalated to absorb the costs of 
marketing and sales. Rezak (2002) found that the industry average for marketing and 
sales expenses in the United States timeshare market ran typically between 45% and 50% 
of total timeshare sales volume.   
The Secondary Timeshare Market 
 It is generally difficult for a timeshare owner to locate a buyer for his or her 
timeshare once it is offered for resale.  Therefore, the price is typically drastically 
lowered (Mohl, 2002).  Baumann (2002) finds that there are three main reasons timeshare 
owners wish to sell their intervals,  
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1. There is an “empty nest” situation for the owners of the timeshare unit.  The 
owners’ children have reached adulthood and are no longer taking vacations 
with the parents. 
2. Unexpected financial stress. 
3. The owners never take full use of their timeshare.  The unit is unused for the 
majority of years of ownership. 
When the timeshare property is sold by deed, the owner has the option to list the property 
for sale, usually with a resale agency that specializes in previously purchased timeshare 
properties.  It is not unusual for the timeshare firms themselves to have some type of 
‘buy-back’ program available to its owners (Powanga & Powanga, 2008).  Timeshare 
resort developers prefer these buy-back programs because the company can maintain 
control of the retail prices and keep the prices high relative to the prices available on the 
resale market (Powanga & Powanga, 2008).   
Timeshare properties also depreciate at a tremendous pace.  Powanga and 
Powanga (2008) found that a unit that was sold at retail for $18,000 might only receive 
offers of several hundred dollars on the secondary market.  Murphy (2008a) found that 
resold units could eventually interrupt new timeshare development efforts since it has 
been widely reported that timeshares on the resale market are listed at a fraction of the 
retail price. Fred Wilson, Chief Attorney for the Florida Real Estate Commission, said the 
following in relation to the depreciation of timeshare units: 
“Take a typical new unit that sells for $10,000…the unit costs $3,000 to construct, 
then add $5,000 in marketing costs and a $2,000 profit.  There’s nothing wrong 
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with the system, as long as you realize it’s a lot like buying a car, the minute you 
drive it off the lot, its value drops.” (Giese, 1990, p. 41). 
 One of the reasons why owners can only sell their timeshare for a portion of the 
original cost is that other significant costs were added to the initial retail price at the time 
of purchase.  These expenses include the cost of marketing and sales and other 
administrative costs.   
Woods (2001) identifies that the cost of marketing timeshare products in the 
United States runs on average between 40% and 55% of the development costs of the 
timeshare product.  The timeshare industry must spend significant amounts of money to 
develop a potential customer through its marketing and sales efforts.  Direct mail, 
telemarketing, and off-premises contact locations all incur expenses that the timeshare 
company must cover in its retail sales.  This is in addition to the substantial capital costs 
associated with the actual development of the timeshare properties (Woods, 2001).     
 Owners who are participating in ‘club memberships’ do not face the same burden 
that deeded owners face in terms of wanting to unload their financial obligations.  Club 
members may simply cancel their memberships in which case the point inventory simply 
goes back into the timeshare club’s inventory for resale.  In contrast, the typical timeshare 
owner who paid $30,000 for a timeshare unit might get less than $3,000 if the owner 
attempts to sell the unit back to the developer, assuming the developer wants that specific 
unit of inventory back at all (Murphy, 2008a).   
Dangers of the Secondary Market for Owners 
When timeshare owners become unhappy with their ownership of the timeshare 
product, they find their choices are somewhat limited when they wish to sell their 
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timeshares. The channels that are available range from expensive independently licensed 
real estate brokers who specialize in timeshare resales and licensed real estate brokers 
who have an agreement with certain timeshare resorts, down to inexpensive online 
timeshare “brokers.”  However, the least expensive method of selling a timeshare is by 
owner.  It is of interest to note that the ARDA International Foundation in 2000 estimated 
that only one in eight timeshare owners are successful in selling their timeshares, price 
notwithstanding. 
Data on timeshare resales in the secondary market is difficult to obtain.  Sales 
figures are only tracked in detail for retail timeshare sales and are simply estimated for 
the secondary market.  Despite lingering effects from the Great Recession, national retail 
timeshare sales actually increased in 2012 over 2011, with sales up to $6.9 billion in 2012 
versus $6.5 billion in 2011 (AIF, 2013a).      
  A 2010 study conducted by the ARDA International Foundation found that the 
most common re-sale channel for owners looking to sell their timeshare was to utilize 
licensed real estate brokers who specialize in timeshare units, followed by real estate 
brokers connected to timeshare firms, and coming in third was online resale advertising 
firms (AIF, 2010).  Of the three avenues for resale, the online firms simply try to connect 
potential buyers with timeshare owners looking to sell their unit(s).  It is important to 
note that these firms, for the purposes of this paper, are unlicensed to operate as real 
estate sales agents, so they cannot legally broker a real estate deal in the state of Florida.  
These entities are merely “advertisers” that happen to collect substantial fees for their 
services.  Since these online resellers routinely state that they have solid success rates, 
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financially overwhelmed timeshare owners who neither want to, nor can afford to pay for 
the services of a licensed real estate agent, often utilize the services of these firms.   
 Baumann (1999) explained the red flags of disreputable timeshare resale operators 
in the late 1990s, and offered the following tips for timeshare owners wanting to sell their 
timeshares (as told by Cliff Hagberg, a former president of ARDA): 
 Be wary of advance fees asked by appraisal companies or real estate brokers 
 If a company tells you (the timeshare owner) that they have a buyer already lined 
up for a purchase, it is usually not true 
 Steer clear of ads in the newspaper or the Internet  as a channel for selling a 
timeshare interest 
 Be aware that timeshare intervals typically do not appreciate in value 
A study conducted by the Research Intelligence Group for the ARDA 
International Foundation (2013) found the majority of owners looking to sell their 
timeshares on the secondary market claimed that ease of the transaction was the key 
driver for choosing a reseller, followed by the speed of the transaction (AIF, 2013b).  
Online resellers’ competitive advantage over traditional real estate agents is that they are 
based online and can be easily and quickly accessed.  Due to search engine optimization, 
online resellers can more directly and easily target people searching for timeshares or 
timeshare resales.  
The resale market has had an increase in unscrupulous resale operators, many of 
which are Internet-based, who have taken advantage of timeshare owners attempting to 
sell their timeshares.  These “scam” resale operators typically required money from 
timeshare owners in advance, claiming the fees were for closing costs or advertising 
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services, and then disappeared with the money (Elmore, 2012).  The Florida timeshare 
market was particularly hard-hit by online scam resale operators and it is estimated that 
the most frequent method of targeting the elderly by fraudulent operators is via Internet 
(Reisig & Holfreter, 2007).  The percentage of adult Floridians aged 65 and over is 
approximately 30% greater than the national average, at 17.6% of Florida’s total 
population in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  Studies have shown that elderly 
consumers are more vulnerable to instances of fraud than younger consumers (Lee & 
Soberon-Ferrer, 1997; Reisig & Holtfreter, 2007).   
Taking Advantage of Distressed Timeshare Owners 
It is not uncommon to find financially strapped timeshare owners, who wish to be 
released from their timeshare commitment, turning to online resellers only to end up 
swindled.  Many of these online reseller firms contact the timeshare owner, who, upon 
browsing the site, submits a request for information. The reseller then contacts the owner 
and tells the owner that they have interested buyers. Typically, these companies then tell 
the owner that all they need to do is pay closing cost and title fees, which can cost the 
owner thousands of dollars (Hicken, 2013).  Once the money is paid to the online reseller, 
the “buyer” never buys the timeshare, because a buyer never really existed, and the owner 
is told that the money went instead for advertising and listing services for their timeshare 
unit (Strain, 2012).  In most cases no written contract is ever presented to the timeshare 
owner for signature, therefore, it becomes difficult for the owner to attempt 
reimbursement for the fees already paid.  If a contract has been presented to the owner, 
the contracts usually make no stipulation about fees being paid (Strain, 2011).  In the 
best-case scenario for the dishonest reseller, the reseller simply stalls the owner 
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indefinitely, having never arranged for a buyer for the unit nor returned the upfront fee; 
this scenario plays-out in the majority of cases (Perkins, 2012).   
An example of a “deal” with one of these dishonest timeshare resale operators 
was the case of the five people from Boca Raton and Boynton Beach who were took $2.6 
million from timeshare owners in a scam that spanned the entire U.S. (a federal crime).  
The operators targeted distraught timeshare owners and persuaded them to pay closing 
fees for the “impending sale of their unit”. The owners were told they would receive their 
fees back after the final sale was completed (Clarkson, 2012).     
In keeping with the telemarketing scam, another example is from Palm Beach 
County, where a former New York City detective was involved in an operation that tele- 
marketed to timeshare owners, which again required the owners to send money to the 
telemarketer based on the premise that a buyer was waiting to purchase their timeshare 
(Burstein, 2012).  The former detective was sentenced to over 12 years in prison for the 
$3 million that his operation took from timeshare owners (Burstein, 2012).   
A ring of telemarketers based in Ft. Lauderdale, FL, was ordered to shut down 
operations in 2010 (before the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act was passed) by a 
federal district court at the request of the Federal Trade Commission, as a result of 
numerous complaints about the operation, which did business as Timeshare Mega Media 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2010). The operators marketed their services to timeshare 
owners through telemarketing efforts, and convinced the timeshare owner that a buyer 
was waiting to purchase the timeshare, a hallmark claim made by many of these 
marketing scams.  Timeshare Mega Media then sent a contract to the owners, suggesting 
that it was a sales contract, when in reality it was merely a marketing contract.  The 
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company then asked for a fee of usually $1,996 from the owner through a credit card, 
unless a timeshare unit was particularly expensive, wherein the marketing contract cost 
was as high as 10% of the retail value of the timeshare unit (Federal Trade Commission, 
2010).  Examples of timeshare owners falling victim to these fraudulent resale operators 
prompted the creation of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act.   
Even with the negative publicity generated by fraudulent operators scamming 
timeshare owners out of millions of dollars, the retail timeshare industry continues to 
realize increasing quarterly sales.  In 2011, retail timeshare sales were up 2.4% over 2010 
with sales for smaller timeshare companies, such as Bluegreen, realizing significantly 
larger sales, up 21.6% in the second quarter of 2011 over 2010.  Another example is 
Diamond Resorts, which in the 2011 second quarter realized sales up 34.5% over 2010 
(Watkins, 2012).   
The Importance of Florida 
In Orlando alone, it is estimated that timeshare visitors spent an average of $1,785 
per travel party during 2011 (AIF, 2012).  When this figure is extrapolated for all 
timeshare visitors to Orlando area timeshare resorts, the total dollar amount is estimated 
to be $363 million.  However, and perhaps more importantly, these timeshare traveling 
parties spend an estimated $1.3 billion at other local non-timeshare businesses (Dorf, 
2014).  The timeshare index shows that of the most in-demand timeshare resorts in the 
world, Florida has four of the top ten most in-demand resorts in the world (“Timeshare 
Demand Index,” 2013).  
 Florida recognizes this large financial impact of the timeshare industry and 
listens to what the industry has to say.  In terms of employment and the timeshare 
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industry’s relationship to the rest of the economy, the industry’s employment multiplier is 
higher than that of restaurants, general retail, and hotels in the same areas (AIF, 2012).   
The employment multiplier is a number that represents the multiplier for other jobs that 
are created per number of timeshare industry jobs.  For instance, in 2011 the timeshare 
industry’s multiplier was 2.28.  This means that for every timeshare job (1.00), 1.28 
additional jobs were created in other industries.  It is also worth noting that 2011 was a 
year still marked by weak economic recovery from the Great Recession.   
The acting director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, Charles Harwood, stated in June 2013 that, “truly we have an epidemic of 
fraud in this area” (Hicken, 2013).  The area that Harwood referred to was Miami, 
Florida, where timeshare scammers had centralized.  Though these issues were occurring 
nationwide, Florida contains over 24% of all United States-based timeshare units (AIF, 
2006).  Therefore, Florida became a concentrated area for fraudulent operators seeking to 
defraud timeshare owners.  
This type of scam became so common in Florida that timeshare related complaints 
constituted the state’s number one fraud complaint in 2010 (Elmore, 2012).   Florida 
Attorney General Pam Bondi’s office received almost 7,000 complaints during a nine-
month period in 2011.  That was more than all other consumer complaints in the state 
combined (Elmore, 2012).  From 2009 to 2011, the Florida Attorney General’s Office 
received more than 19,000 complaints about timeshare reseller fraud (Strain, 2011).  
Florida Governor Scott realized that these timeshare scammers were hurting the 
timeshare industry’s image in Florida and remarked as such in June of 2012 on a visit to 
the University of Central Florida’s Rosen College of Hospitality Management: 
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“As visitors enjoy their vacation and business travel to Florida, it is only natural 
for them to want to figure out ways to keep coming back, and timeshares can be a 
way for vacationers to keep returning to our state.  Unfortunately, several scams 
involving timeshare marketers have eroded investor’s confidence in the timeshare 
system,” (Tremblay, 2012). 
These fraudulent resellers are mainly located in central and south Florida, and 
authorities in Florida have taken actions against them.  In 2012, 10 of 17 known 
timeshare telemarketing/reseller firms were under subpoena by the Attorney General’s 
Office (Elmore, 2012).  Despite these efforts, additional action was needed in terms of 
revising existing state statutes to address these industry-damaging elements of the Florida 
timeshare business.   
The Florida Legislature Takes Action 
 In an effort to control this growing problem, Florida House Representative Eric 
Eisnaugle introduced a bill in December of 2011. This bill, HB 1001, which became the 
Timeshare Resale Accountability Act on July 1, 2012, addressed many of the issues 
regarding how timeshare resellers operate in the state of Florida.   The bill focuses 
primarily on how timeshare resellers operate and delineates penalties for operators who 
violate these laws that could result in a fine not to exceed $15,000 for each violation 
under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Turner, 2012).  The main aspects of 
the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act are as follows, a timeshare resale advertiser 
cannot misrepresent to the seller that a buyer is interested in purchasing a timeshare unit; 
a timeshare resale advertiser cannot demand payment of fees before any agreements or 
contracts have been presented to the seller for signature; a timeshare resale advertiser 
 
 
26 
 
must honor a seller’s request to cancel the firm’s services within seven days of a signed 
agreement; a timeshare resale advertiser cannot mislead a customer as to the success rate 
of the reseller’s sales/success rate; a timeshare resale advertiser may not provide 
brokerage or direct sale services; and a timeshare resale advertiser must provide a full 
refund of canceled contracts within a 20-day period (Turner, 2012).  
 Another important feature of the new law is that it requires that resellers honor a 
“cooling off” period.  The new law indicates that the owner has seven days to cancel the 
agreement or contract with the reseller (Perkins, 2012).  Additionally, the reseller is now 
required to provide a full refund to a timeshare owner who cancels his or her contract 
within 20 days (Strain, 2012).  Moreover, the reseller must acknowledge their success 
records in transactions that have actually resulted in a successful sale or a successful 
rental for the previous two calendar years (Strain, 2012).   
 The Timeshare Resale Accountability Act has the support of the major players in 
the timeshare industry, the American Resort Development Association (ARDA) and 
Wyndham Vacation Ownership, the largest timeshare company in America.  The 
following is a statement form Wyndham Vacation Ownership’s President and CEO Franz 
Hanning: 
“Attorney General Bondi has put timeshare resale companies on notice in the state 
of Florida.  Our industry has long benefited from responsible regulations that 
protect consumers and ensure the integrity of products and services.  Timeshare 
resale companies should not be exempt from these standards and we applaud 
Attorney General Bondi for leading this effort on behalf of Florida timeshare 
owners and our industry at large” (Wyndham Worldwide, 2011). 
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ARDA’s President and CEO Howard Nusbaum echoed the same sentiments 
stating, “Florida has taken a giant step in providing consumer protection against 
fraudulent and deceptive business practices utilized by unsavory timeshare resellers” 
(Becker, 2012).  The bill was sponsored in the Florida Senate by Florida Senate Majority 
Leader Andy Gardiner and was approved by Florida Governor Rick Scott on April 6, 
2012 to take effect on July 1, 2012 (Florida Senate, 2012).  The bill passed without 
opposition in either chamber; the Florida Senate voted 40 – 0 and the Florida House 
voted 113 – 0 (Florida House of Representatives, 2012).    
Armed with this new law, Florida authorities, as well as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) have made significant progress in pursuing any fraudulent entities 
that did not relocate out of state.  Large-scale arrests were made and dozens of 
individuals were incarcerated after being convicted of stealing millions of dollars from 
owners across the country. The FBI issued an alert pertaining to timeshare scams as they 
witnessed a significant increase in complaints about these fraudulent reseller firms.  
Many timeshare scams involve telemarketers based in Florida who also contact owners 
across the United States to solicit fee payments.  Since these crimes occur across state 
lines, the FBI becomes involved due to the wire or mail fraud that is associated with these 
transactions. 
Future of the Industry 
 Since Florida has passed legislation to protect its local timeshare owners, other 
states are now seeing an increase of timeshare resellers.  This could be attributed to 
resellers who have relocated from Florida to avoid paying fines and more harsh penalties. 
California has the second largest concentration in the United States with 8% of the total 
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number of timeshare units (AIF, 2006).  Colorado has also seen increases in fraudulent 
operations.  In February 2013, the California Department of Real Estate issued a warning 
about timeshare fraud schemes involving wire transfers to sell a timeshare unit on the 
secondary market (Bell, 2013).  This particular warning specifically mentioned certain 
timeshare properties in Mexico and warned Californians to be wary of unwanted 
telephone/mail solicitations from timeshare re-sale representatives (Bell, 2013).  
Colorado, which has the fourth largest timeshare unit concentration in the U.S., and Utah 
are also considering legislation similar to Florida’s Timeshare Resale Accountability Act.  
However, these states would target more “timeshare transfer” companies instead of just 
re-sale advertisers. 
The Federal Trade Commission (2013) issued a press release stating that they and 
their law enforcement partners across the nation have initiated 191 “actions” to 
effectively handle timeshare resellers.  Since then, law enforcement seems to be making 
progress. The Federal Trade Commission in May of the same year stated that federal 
courts blocked the operations of three resale firms that allegedly defrauded more than $18 
million from timeshare owners looking for help in selling their timeshares.  Additionally, 
83 civil actions were filed in 28 states by that time, with over 184 persons facing federal 
and local charges (Hicken, 2013).  The more the public hears of law enforcement making 
arrests and charging people with felonies, the more the public might research their 
timeshare purchasing and selling options more thoroughly.  They will also see that efforts 
are being made to streamline and legitimize the timeshare re-sale industry. 
Although industry leaders claim that the secondary market needs to be addressed, 
there are those who turn a blind eye.  Jim Lewis, President of Disney Vacation Club, was 
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asked about the need to clean up the resale market.  He responded, “Resales aren’t the 
problem, fraud is,” (Stoessel, 2010).     
 Overwhelmingly, people agree that the retail timeshare market should consider 
the problems within the secondary market.  An unintended consequence of the law may 
be that it brings more attention to the fact that many retail timeshare owners are 
attempting to be released from their contracts.  An ancillary effect may be the shift in 
potential buyers’ opinions about the timeshare product itself at the retail level.  With so 
much negative publicity surrounding the troubled resale market, would-be retail 
purchasers might think “why are so many timeshare owners trying to sell their 
timeshares?” Logic would dictate that there is an inherent flaw in the product at the retail 
level.   
ARDA president and CEO, Howard Nusbaum, sees the secondary market fraud 
problems as a constant challenge to be dealt with on a state-by-state basis.  He states that 
the Florida law concerning the resale market is a “first good step to fixing the problem,” 
and that he is proud of the industry’s work with Florida officials to get the Timeshare 
Resale Accountability Act passed (Watkins, 2012).  The Florida law is indeed a good first 
step, but the industry can take more steps to curtail the proliferation of resellers that 
appear to take advantage of overwhelmed timeshare owners.  The secondary market is 
something that the retail market must look deeper at, and Nusbaum does address the 
industry’s need to “buoy up” the timeshare product so the secondary market will not be 
so alluring to potential buyers (Watkins, 2012).  Efforts made by the industry to curtail 
the dishonest resale operators as well as lobbying efforts to pass federal laws pertaining 
to the secondary timeshare market can only help the retail timeshare industry.  A more 
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realistic approach is that each state that has a substantial timeshare resort population 
would pass state laws that are similar to the Florida law.  
 The retail product seems simply too expensive when compared side-by-side with 
a timeshare product that is available on the secondary market.  A 2010 study 
commissioned by the ARDA International Foundation in 2011 found that the median 
resale price for a timeshare unit was $9,000, however, the median price of a retail 
timeshare unit is $20,468.  The resale price may be driven further down in the near to 
intermediate future, as the economy does not seem to be making great strides in terms of 
unemployment, underemployment, and the amount of disposable income would-be 
customers need to have available to in order to realistically consider a timeshare purchase 
(AIF, 2011).   
In 2012, the typical retail timeshare owner profile is that of a 51-year-old person 
who pays a mortgage on an existing home and who has a $74,000 median household 
income according to the American Resort Development Association’s Membership 
Prospectus of 2013.  This profile could be expected to change and if it does, it would not 
be for the good of the industry.   
Financing Industry Operations with Securitizations 
 Stringam (2010) performed a SWOT (Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and 
Threats) analysis on the vacation ownership industry by talking with strategic decision 
makers to find out what key leaders in the industry thought were critical strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the industry.  Weaknesses in the industry were 
found to be mainly financial.  This could be due to the heavy reliance on lenders to keep 
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the industry flush with funding for operations.  This has led the timeshare industry into 
seeking securitizations.  
Historically, there were two types of interests in property, equity interests, which 
signified ownership, and security interest, which signified debt (Graff, 2006).  Until the 
1970s, when a bank or another financial institution originated a loan, it was held on its 
balance sheet until the loan was paid off (Singh, 2001).  The secondary market in real 
estate began when lenders in a particular geographical area, who had more available 
capital than demand for it, bought mortgages from lenders in geographical areas that had 
a shortage of capital (Singh, 2001).  The United States government played a significant 
part in the development of the securitization process as a financial tool.  The government 
created the secondary residential mortgage market in the early 1970s by creating the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (also known as Freddie Mac), and the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (or Fannie Mae).  These organizations allowed mortgage 
lenders an avenue to increase the liquidity of their businesses (Kyle & Kosiba, 2005).  
The secondary market received further impetus in the early 1990s when the Resolution 
Trust Corporation (RTC), a government-owned asset management entity, acquired failed 
savings and loans (S&Ls) and banks and sold off non-performing mortgages (Singh, 
2001).   
There are a number of definitions for securitization and for what it means to a 
company.  The definition that will be used in the context of this paper is, “a type of debt 
security that is based on pools of assets, or collateralized by cash flows from a specified 
pool of underlying assets” (Fang & Long, 2009, p. 248). What are mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS)?  Lewis Ranieri introduced the concept of securitization in the late 
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1970s to advance the growth of a secondary market for mortgage-backed securities (Kyle 
& Kosiba, 2014; McNamee, 2004).   
  In a mortgage-backed security, the asset is the actual physical house that is 
attached to the mortgage. Graff (2006), defines securitization as: “the process whereby 
illiquid interests in property are converted into marketable limited liability securities that 
preserve the investment characteristics of the original interests other than illiquidity and 
liability exposure,” (p. 235).   
The act of securitizing mortgages takes place on the secondary mortgage market 
where the involved financial entities are able to raise capital by selling “pooled” 
mortgages.  These are mortgages that were originally issued to individual homeowners on 
the primary mortgage market (Haffner, 2008).  Assets that may be too risky by 
themselves to invest in can be pooled together to reduce risk by way of diversification.  
This can make investing in assets, even those assets that would normally not be attractive 
to invest in, appear worthwhile to an investor (Fang & Long, 2009).  With the practice of 
pooling residential mortgages by retail banks and savings and loan firms, securitization 
can touch virtually every type of financial asset held by a corporation, whether it is a 
financial services company, manufacturing company or another commercial enterprise 
(Morrison, 1993).  Interestingly, residential mortgages that qualify for insurance from any 
government-sponsored entity are deemed too small for securitization of individual 
mortgages to be economically viable (Graff, 2006).     
A typical securitization transaction occurs when a company, also called the 
originator, sells its assets that generate a steady stream of cash flows to a specially 
created corporation or trust, often called a special purpose vehicle (SPV), who then puts 
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them into a pool that credit enhancements are then applied to (which are instruments used 
to raise the rating of the SPV), and finally finances the purchase via issuing tradable 
securities (Long & Fang, 2009). The assets described that generate a steady stream of 
cash flows can include residential mortgages, credit card receivables, retail auto loans, 
leases, home equity loans, trade receivables, or even student loans (Morrison, 1993).  
Timeshare mortgages would fall under the mortgages category.  Investors that purchase 
the SPV’s securities are actually purchasing the right to future cash flows generated by 
the underlying asset, in this case the mortgage (Haffner, 2008). 
Why Securitize? 
Since securitization allows assets to be transferred off a firm’s balanced sheet, 
there are those who describe securitizations more as “techniques” rather than products.  
Tucker (2012) describes securitizations: “a securitization is a transaction, whether funded 
from contractual cash flows or not, whereby such cash flows are isolated from the 
bankruptcy risk of the original or current owner, whether by ownership, security, or other 
form of control,” (p. 20).  This securitization process makes it possible for firms to 
separate otherwise non-marketable assets from their balance sheet and, often with the 
help of credit enhancement, turn them into negotiable instruments (Kotecha, 1998).    
One of the primary differences between the sale of assets and the securitized sale 
of assets is that regular asset sales usually involve the sale of productive assets, such as 
property.  This is in contrast to securitization deals with assets that are of the fixed-
income nature, such as receivables, that have an expected future cash flow (Thomas, 
1999).  Significant abnormal returns have been found when firms announce the selling of 
physical, or productive assets (Alexander, Benson, & Kampmeyer, 1984; Jain, 1985).  
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Ambrose, Lacour-Little, and Sanders (2005) studied the factors that went into the 
decisions of corporations on whether or not they may want to securitize a given MBS in 
their loan portfolios.  The factors the authors looked at were information asymmetry, 
regulatory capital arbitrage and reputation of the firm, or lender (Ambrose, et al., 2005).  
Would the degree of risk associated with a loan determine whether the lender would keep 
the loan on its books or would the firm want to place the loan for sale on the secondary 
market (mortgage market, in the form of a securitized asset)?  If there were information 
that the lender had, but that the secondary market lacked, would this encourage the lender 
to keep a loan on its balance sheet?  A lender may wish to retain loans instead of 
securitizing them if the lender considered the loan of high-performance value based on 
information the lender was exclusively privy.   This is where agency conflict and possible 
moral hazards may occur. 
Agency Conflict and Moral Hazard 
One significant motive for securitization by financial intermediaries is to reduce 
information asymmetry by providing more transparency into the nature of the securitized 
assets (Gasbarro, Stevenson, Schwebach, & Zumwalt, 2005).  What is asymmetric 
information?  One class of informational asymmetry is the set of differences among 
investors that deal in information that exists between investors at the time the 
securitization is issued (Iacobucci & Winter, 2005).  Another class of asymmetric 
information exists between managers and investors about managerial actions and 
uncertain factors that can affect security payoffs.  These are realized during the period 
between the security issue and the date of security maturity, also known as agency 
problems (Iacobucci and Winter, 2005).  Gasbarro, et al., (2005) explains that the more 
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firm-specific a company’s assets, the more information asymmetry exists about the firm 
and the greater the moral hazard perceived by outsiders.  They also argue that this issue 
of information asymmetry arises naturally when ownership is separated from 
management. 
Since rating agencies monitor securitizations, they help reduce information 
asymmetry and can be used to improve a firm’s reputation (Gasbarro, et al., 2005).  Hill 
(1996) indicates that the required level of credit enhancement is worked out with rating 
agencies and insurers prior to the pricing of an actual transaction.  Accordingly, the 
quality of the receivables that is being pooled has great influence on the rating itself.  
Goldstein (1996) found that levels of credit enhancement could become quite stringent 
for receivables of lower quality.   
To help remedy the situations where asymmetric information exists between the 
security issuer or underwriter and the investing public, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) proposed amendments to its Regulation AB (asset-backed).  These 
amendments would handle disclosure and reporting requirements in securitizations and 
the offering process itself (Kenyon, 2011).  The SEC proposed these amendments in 
2010, but those in the securitization industry met those proposals with dismay over 
matters of loan-level information disclosure.  As a result, the SEC launched a “re-posal” 
in 2011 that addressed those concerns, but which did not go far enough, as market 
practitioners had privacy concerns about data at that level (FSR Insights, 2014).  On 
August 27, 2014, the SEC decided on a final set of revisions to Regulation AB that 
increased transparency in securitization transactions to include extensive loan-level data 
requirements for specific asset classes.   
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Regulation AB was created in December of 2004 and went into effect January 1, 
2006 by the Security and Exchange Commission as the first body of rules and regulations 
regarding asset-backed securities, and covers four general areas, communication 
practices, disclosure, registration, and the periodic testing of asset-backed securities-
related issues (Chapman and Cutler, 2015).  
  Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (2012) examined the potential agency 
conflict that would exist as a result of the separation of the originator of a loan and the 
risk of default to the originator. The typical underwriter of a mortgage does not wish to 
keep loans on their books and looks to sell them on the secondary market.  The problem 
for investors is that they cannot know the efforts made by the mortgage underwriter to 
screen its loan applicants, so investors do not know the quality of the mortgages offered 
(Hartman-Glaser, et al., 2012). Jensen and Meckling (1976) put forth that corporate 
stakeholder’s interest are always conflicting with each other, and the behavior of the 
agent is predicated upon opportunism and self-interest.   
The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) (2006) points out a 
potential conflict of interest or a principal/agent conflict, in the management of Freddie 
Mac.  The agency’s management was shown to be manipulating accounting procedures in 
order to falsely meet earnings targets, thereby increasing executive compensation by way 
of incentive earnings and bonuses paid out.   
Benefits of Securitization 
The concept of asset securitization as a financial tool for a corporation has several 
major benefits.  Morrison (1993) delineates these benefits into three areas, accounting, 
raising capital, and regulatory compliance.  In terms of accounting, the most significant 
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advantage for a company to use securitizations is that the assets are removed from the 
firm’s balance sheet, which enables the recognition of a financial gain or loss almost 
immediately (Kyle & Kosiba, 2005).  This would also remove any associated liabilities 
related to the removed asset (Morrison, 1993).  A company’s financial goals of 
improving its return-on-assets would therefore benefit from securitization, as would any 
capital-to-assets ratios (Morrison, 1993).   
In the area of raising capital, the bundling of assets creates a higher credit rating 
for the securities than the originator of the security individually may itself possess. This 
lowers financing costs when compared to straight-debt offerings in order to raise capital 
(Morrison, 1993).  Securitizations usually reduce the reliance a firm may have on raising 
funds through unsecured debt (Kyle & Kosiba, 2005).  If the pooled assets are considered 
top-tiered investments, this would allow a corporation greater access to a variety of 
capital sources, to include money market funds and insurance firms.  These sources 
usually have regulations or covenants that restrict their ability to purchase speculative-
grade obligations (Morrison, 1993). This credit enhancement typically allows 
securitization issues to earn a higher investment grade, or rating, from the primary 
investment rating agencies (Greenbaum & Thakor, 1987). 
Lastly, regulatory compliance is met when a firm has adequate capital 
requirements to meet its obligations.  Securitizations allow the originator to avoid 
restrictive covenants, thus allowing the shifting of “catastrophic” loss from the originator 
to investor (Morrison, 1993).  
Chiu and Hsieh (2007) examined the long-run operating performance of 447 firms 
that issued asset backed securities during the period from 1990-2001.  They found an 
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occurrence of positive abnormal returns in a three-month to three-year period subsequent 
to the announcement of the security issue.  Their study found that although securitizing 
firms did see a positive stock price reaction at the time of the securitization 
announcement, there was no evidence of any long-term positive abnormal stock price 
returns.  In their study, they did not find any indication of validation of the “under-
reaction” hypothesis in that securitizing firms should be able to perform better than the 
market.  However, the researchers did see an improvement in performance in the 
securitizing firms over their non-securitizing counterparts in selected industries.  Thus, 
long-term abnormal returns were not found and were in fact inconsistent with the under-
reaction hypothesis due to the price of stocks.  According to this hypothesis, securitizing 
firms should outperform the market because investors are overly optimistic about the 
prospects of securitizing firms.   
If a lender wanted to cut its capital arbitrage, as well as interest and credit risk, 
then the expectation would be that most loans in the lender’s portfolio would be 
securitized (Ambrose, et al., 2005).  This course of action, however, would have the 
lender attempting to securitize high-risk loans (loans with a high propensity for either 
default or early prepayment) to the secondary market.  In this process, the lender would 
incur a loss of credibility among the major firms that purchase securities in the secondary 
market (Ambrose, et al., 2005).  The researchers also examined if regulatory capital 
requirements for lenders had an effect on a lender’s decision to securitize loans.  They 
found that lenders held higher-risk and higher-yielding loans, but ultimately could not 
differentiate the loss of reputation hypotheses from their capital arbitrage hypothesis.  
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This was in part because both hypotheses predicted securitized loans would have lower 
default rates than the loans a lender would choose to retain in its portfolio.   
Ambrose, et al., (2005), analyzed 14,285 conventional fixed rate mortgages 
originated between 1995 and 1997, and observed through October of 2000 to be able to 
determine defaults and prepayments.  The researchers found that loans that had higher 
default probabilities were more likely to be retained and less likely to be offered for sale 
in the secondary market.  This could be because the lender wishes to maintain its 
reputation in the secondary market and keep high-risk loans in its portfolio (Ambrose, et 
al. 2005).  The researchers also found that loans that had a higher propensity for 
prepayment were negatively related to whether the lender would retain the loan in its 
portfolio.  This means that these loans were more likely to be offered for sale on the 
secondary market (Ambrose, et al., 2005).   
Demarzo and Duffie (1999) studied the result of security issuance when 
information was available only to the issuer of the security and not the rational investor. 
If it becomes known that the issuer has information about the securities that the investors 
do not, the investors may consider these types of securities “lemons.”  In this case, the 
investor would only be willing to purchase these securities at greatly reduced prices 
(Akerlof, 1970).  The securitization of assets may be an effective way to avoid a “lemon” 
market premium on general security issues.  This is because securitized assets often have 
cash flows with risk that is more easily assessed than the risk of the general assets of the 
firm, such as physical assets or intangibles like goodwill (Iacobucci & Winter, 2005).   
Securitization avoids, generally speaking, any leverage an investor may have on 
the performance of a firm because of the sheer volume of shares an investor may own.  
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When an investor buys securitized assets, it is purchasing the underlying cash flows of 
the collateral, not a stake in the ownership of the firm itself.  
Indeed, Kahn and Winton (1998) found in their study that large investors, or 
institutional investors, may choose to “intelligently” pressure a firm in which it has 
invested, and actually may purchase additional shares in anticipation of the pressure 
being exerted on the firm to perform better, hence having information that the investing 
public does not have. These investors are practicing “intervention” instead of 
“speculation” or speculative behavior exhibited by more traditional investors (Khan & 
Winton, 1998).  
Another viewpoint on why securitization is an instrument of cost-saving for an 
organization, looks at securitization in terms of “hedging” against the volatility of interest 
rates and reducing the intermediation costs involved in the securitization process (Hess & 
Smith, 1988).  The researchers argue that the act of hedging provides an organization 
with the ability to cut the operating costs in four ways: 
1. Reducing expected taxes  
2. Reducing the differential in compensation that acts as an incentive for entities 
with poor-diversified claims to give business to the organization that is issuing 
the security 
3. Reducing the “underinvestment” problem 
4. Reducing bankruptcy expenses  
An additional benefit that a firm may realize by securitization is that securitization 
increases the financial slack of a firm by expanding its borrowing capacity through the 
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reduction of risk through portfolio diversification, thus serving as a source of lower-cost 
financing (Gasbarro, et al., 2005).  
A firm may wish to securitize its assets to raise capital instead of partaking in debt 
financing.  Securitizations (for those firms in the lodging sector) may avoid many of the 
disadvantages of debt financing, which Elgonemy (2002) ascertains as the property 
owner being “enslaved” to the lender, thus interfering with management’s ability to 
competently operate the property. 
Wealth Effects of Securitization 
Asset securitization might be a well-spring of wealth creation for equity holders 
since the management of a healthy firm can decide the conditions under which it will sell 
its assets (Thomas, 1999).  Securitizations may also increase equity claimants by 
securitizing certain assets to obtain necessary funding and investing it in positive net 
present value projects (Fang & Long, 2009).  Accordingly, it would be expected that the 
announcement of a securitization by a firm that is regarded as financially healthy would 
be greeted by a positive share price effect (Fang & Long, 2009).  Conversely, it might be 
expected that a forced sale of assets by a distressed firm could be interpreted by the 
market as confirmation of the firm’s poor condition, which would result in a 
corresponding drop in firm value (Thomas, 2001).  For firms that make frequent 
securitizations, investors tend to believe that management is trying to use a comparative 
advantage in securitization to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Long & Fang, 2009).  
 Lang, Poulsen, & Stulz (1995) examined non-fixed income asset sales from non-
financial corporations and found that the stock market reaction to asset sales is positive 
only when the proceeds of the sale are paid out to shareholders.  Thomas (1999) 
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attempted to find the reason behind the expansion of securitizations by performing tests 
of stockholder and bondholder wealth changes upon 236 securitization transactions 
(reduced to 136 transactions) in the U.S. during the years 1990-1996.  He found that 
securitization is significantly wealth creating for shareholders, but that securitization is 
generally neutral for the issuer.  This can also be associated with losses to the asset seller 
when the market is under pressure and gains to the seller when the market is calm.   
 Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera (1996) performed a study to measure the 
wealth effects of asset securitization by examining specific industries, such as the 
financial, industrial and automobile manufacturing, and banking industries.  The 
researchers tested the proposition that securitization leads to increased shareholder wealth 
for the shareholders of firms that issue securitizations.  They looked at four propositions 
in detail: 
1. Wealth effects of ABS differ on the factor of the “financial slack” status of the 
issuing firm 
2. Wealth effects differ on the factor of asset type that is being securitized, such 
as auto loans, credit card receivables, trade and lease receivables 
3. ABS issuance tends to lead to a fluctuation in market and interest rate risk of 
the securities-issuing firm 
4. Wealth effects from securitization would differ based on industry  
The researchers found that wealth effects were indeed industry specific. Financial 
firms saw shareholder wealth gains while banking firms saw the opposite and the 
automobile and industrial companies saw no change at the time of their respective 
securitization announcements (Lockwood, Rutherford & Herrera, 1996).  In addition, 
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financially sound banks saw significant wealth gain at the time of ABS announcements, 
while weaker banks saw significant wealth loss (Lockwood, Rutherford & Herrera, 
1996).  As to whether the type of asset being securitized had a significant impact on 
wealth after an announcement of securitization, it was found that the wealth effects were 
unaffected by asset type (Lockwood, Rutherford & Herrera, 1996).  
Securitizations in the Vacation Ownership Industry 
Securitization transactions are those where a firm sells financial assets that 
hopefully generate a positive cash flow to a specific trust that is set up for this purpose.  
The firm then attempts to raise the credit rating on the assets and finance the purchases by 
issuing tradable securities (Fang & Long, 2009).  The more successful timeshare firms 
are in the business of lending to consumers to purchase the firm’s timeshare product, 
however, such a business model makes it difficult to raise capital quickly and efficiently.  
Often revenue is generated through the actual closing costs of loans and the amortized 
monthly payments the buyer makes on the timeshare mortgage (Kyle & Kosiba, 2005).   
This is why securitizations are relevant for timeshare companies.  It is a way for 
timeshare companies to receive operating capital for their business.  Fang & Long (2009) 
found that some companies who are first-time players in the securitization market find 
that wealth is destroyed.  However, wealth is enhanced when the company holds multiple 
securitizations.  Since some of the larger companies opt for multiple securitizations per 
year, the timeshare industry may provide a significant industry to explore in this manner.   
Liquidity refers to how easily a security or asset can be converted into cash.  
Liquidity risk is the risk that the investment will be illiquid.  In the context of timeshares, 
it is the risk associated with the capacity of a consumer to sell a timeshare investment 
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quickly and at a fair price (Hovey, 2002).  If an owner is forced to reduce the price of his 
timeshare unit below market value, if the sale takes considerable time, or if the owner 
incurs expenses to divest the timeshare investment, then it is considered illiquid (Hovey, 
2002). Timeshare units can generally be considered as illiquid (Hovey, 2002).  Liquidity 
is dependent on the demand for the asset and the existence of an active secondary market 
(Hovey, 2002), which the timeshare market certainly has demonstrated.  
Securitizations are important to the operating cash flow of a timeshare company, 
because the timeshare business model does not count on immediate payment in full for its 
inventory.  Using Fang & Long’s (2009) model as a reference and the timeshare 
securities credit rating agency DBRS (2012), below is a basic sequence of events of how 
a securitization of timeshare mortgages would take place. 
First, the timeshare customer makes a purchase of a timeshare unit (either in 
points or fixed week intervals) from a retail timeshare company, utilizing in-house 
financing. It is important to note that the purchase of the fee-simple timeshare product, as 
opposed to the “right-to-use” product type, requires somewhat less credit enhancement, 
which will be explained further in the coming section. The timeshare company then 
bundles together multiple timeshare mortgages that are assigned credit quality ratings. 
This is now an “asset pool.”  Once the timeshare mortgages are placed into a pool of 
similar vehicles, certain credit enhancement tools are applied with hope of raising the 
pool’s rating. 
Rating agencies play a role in determining the credit worthiness of these asset 
pools.  Credit support providers also play a role in helping increase an asset pool’s credit 
worthiness. The asset pool is transferred to a special purpose vehicle that is usually 
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denoted as being bankruptcy remote, meaning that a creditor cannot attach the assets if 
the originator declares bankruptcy, and is typically a corporation or trust (Iacobucci & 
Winter, 2005).  The special purpose vehicle, made up of multiple timeshare mortgages, is 
now available as a tradable security and offered to investment banks.  Finally, these 
banks then offer the security to the investing public.   
Criteria for rating securitizations in the timeshare industry that affect the asset 
pool are delinquency rate, defaults, actual foreclosures, obligor concentrations, pre-
payment rate, and the rate at which mortgages are recovered (Peters, 1997). The 
qualitative aspects of establishing a rating for timeshare securities focus on the security 
originator, the servicer, and the trustee.  In addition, due diligence of the actual timeshare 
resorts are carried out in terms of the examination of the network affiliations, physical 
property and accommodations/amenities, and the timeshare firm’s sales and marketing 
programs (Peters, 1997).  
Duff and Phelps Credit Rating Company, which rates timeshare loans that are 
pooled together for sale as tradable securities, offers criteria that are used for rating 
timeshare receivables.  First, the balance of each timeshare loan must not be more than 
90%.  This assumption is that if a buyer puts less than ten percent down on a purchase, 
the buyer may not be as committed to paying off the balance of the loan.  Second, the 
loan must have matured past the applicable “rescission period” (mandated by state).  This 
guarantees that the loans will not be “kicked back” by the obligor. 
Right-to-use timeshare loans are not rated, as many legal obstacles are in place 
that specifically relate to this type of timeshare purchase. As noted earlier, fee simple 
 
 
46 
 
timeshare products are more readily rated in terms of credit worthiness.  If right-to-use 
loans are included in an asset pool, there is a 100% credit enhancement requirement.  
Geographic location of asset pools is considered.  The assumption is that a geographical 
area may be experiencing significant economic turmoil and as a result, loan defaults may 
be particularly high.  Instances of this type of contingency would be Hurricane Katrina’s 
effect on the timeshare industry in the Gulf Coast of the U.S. 
Considerations are taken when asset pools contain foreign obligors, because 
currency risk and, to a lesser degree, sovereign interference are factors that need to be 
examined.  Another credit rating agency that deals with timeshare receivables is DBRS.  
This agency offers similar guidelines to how it rates timeshare receivables that are pooled 
for sale as tradable securities, focusing on (DBRS, 2012), 
 The quality of the collateral of the receivables pool, 
 Financial condition of the timeshare firm itself, 
 Corporate rating of parent company, if applicable, 
 Experience level of company management team, 
 Ownership structure of the timeshare company itself, 
 Past, present, and potential litigation issues the firm faces, 
 Sources of revenue and any lines of credit available to the timeshare company, 
 History of securitizations by the timeshare company, if applicable, 
 The capital structure of the transaction, 
 Management quality of the sponsoring timeshare firm, 
 Internal accounting controls, 
 Quality controls in place, 
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 Regulatory compliance, 
 Strength and capability of the loan servicers, 
 Legal structure of the loan portfolio, 
 Underwriters’ competence/experience, 
 Trustees’ competence/experience, and 
 Historical performance of the sponsor’s (the timeshare firm) loan portfolio 
(DBRS, 2012). 
 
Special purpose vehicles issue debt securities backed by the cash flow from the 
pool.  In the process of establishing a rating on a mortgage-backed security, the agency 
develops a prime mortgage pool of assets for a specific market to serve as a type of 
benchmark (Kotecha, 1998).  The benchmark level is established on the prime pool and 
subsequently adjusted for actual pools based on inevitable deviations from the prime.  
These take into account the levels of foreclosure and level of loss that serve as a 
benchmark for the worst case of economic stress (Kotecha, 1998).  The structure of the 
issuance provides an appropriate form of credit enhancement and then the security 
receives the appropriate rating (Kotecha, 1998).  
Accounting for securitization is difficult. It can be a powerful financial tool for 
corporations to control income and cash flow; therefore, securitization itself is susceptible 
to accounting abuses (Kyle & Kosiba, 2005).  This is especially true when a company 
securitizes its accounts receivables, which is common practice in the timeshare industry.  
The securitization of receivables may cloud the earnings and cash flow statement of a 
firm.  This can result in operating cash flows showing at an unsustainable level since 
there is a limit to how much a company can securitize its receivables (Siegel, 2006). 
 
 
48 
 
When a firm securitizes its accounts receivables, they usually package their receivables 
that have the highest credit quality together and then transfer them to a variable interest 
entity, or VIE, which are usually deemed “bankruptcy remote” (Siegel, 2006).  
Bankruptcy remote means that creditors cannot touch the assets in the VIE if the sponsor 
of the VIE files for bankruptcy protection (Siegel, 2006).  When long-term receivables 
are securitized, firms can report gains on the sale of these assets.  The book value of these 
receivables do not include interest income that will be earned by the asset as the firm that 
is purchasing the receivables will be paying for that interest (Siegel, 2006).   
For example, Marriott included the sale of its timeshare receivables within its 
revenue from 2000 to 2002 instead of including it as offset to selling, or 
administrative/general expenses, or even as non-operating income (Siegel, 2006).  After 
2003, the company began stating the gains on sale of receivables as other or non-
operating income (Siegel, 2006).  
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Indroduction 
The Event Study 
 MacKinlay (1997) states that an event study “measures the impact of a specific 
event on the value of a firm” (p. 13).  Although Ball and Brown, (1968), and Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) are usually given credit for the widespread introduction of 
the event study into modern financial analysis, MacKinlay (1997) points out that James 
Dolley in 1933 performed what could be construed as the first event study in his 
examination of the price effects of stock splits (or “split-ups”, at the time the article was 
written).   
Event studies utilize financial security data to measure the impact a specific event 
has on a particular firm or industry.  The financial security data in most cases is common 
equity, but debt securities can also be studied under the same procedural guidelines with 
minor adjustments (MacKinlay, 1997).  In finance and economics, event studies are used 
to measure the impact of the value of firms when events take place that affects individual 
firms or a host of firms in an industry.  Some of these events include corporate mergers 
and acquisitions announcements, announcements of changes in senior management, 
issuances of new debt and/or equity, and larger, economy-wide events such as natural 
disasters (Ferstl, Utz, & Wimmer, 2012), firm-specific disasters, such as the MGM Grand 
Hotel fire in 1980 (Baginski, Corbett & Ortega, 1991), changes in regulations and laws 
that effect industries (Ababneh and Tang, 2013; Bosch; Grace, Rose & Karafiath, 1995; 
Nanda & Ross, 2012; Woodrow, Eckard & Lee, 1998), securities-related litigation to 
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ascertain damages (Torchio, 2009; ), the effect of announcing Olympic host cities (Leeds, 
Mirikitani & Tang, 2009), and even what impact President Obama’s remarks about 
“blowing a bunch of cash in Las Vegas” had on the Las Vegas business community (Gift 
& Gift, 2011).  
 Torchio (2009) offers the following definition of an event study, “An event study 
is an empirical technique that measures the effect of new information on the market 
prices of a company’s publicly traded securities” (p. 159).  As stated by Torchio (2009), 
the methodology used in event studies assumes the current price of a security reflects all 
available information available to the investing public and that the price of a stock is 
“equal to the present value of the expected future stream of free cash flows” (p. 161).   
Many diverse industries have used event study methodology to study the impact 
of various events that occurred without warning.  Examples of unexpected events include 
the Johnson and Johnson Tylenol bottle-tampering episodes in 1982, the false bankruptcy 
information in the media about United Airlines in 2008, or the unexpected occurrences of 
a top-level corporate officer dying suddenly (Koch & Fenili, 2013).   
Reynolds (2008) investigated the degree of accuracy that economists have had in 
utilizing event studies to determine if event studies can accurately predict the financial 
impact of new regulations on individual firms affected by the introduction such  
regulations.  The researcher studied the passage of the Byrd Amendment of 2000 and 
found that the degree of accuracy of an event study’s predictive ability to the passage of a 
new law or regulation is extremely dependent on the researcher’s specifications used in 
the event study (Reynolds, 2008).  These specifications include choosing the length of 
time in the event estimation window (the period of time before the actual event took 
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place), defining the length of time to include in the actual event window (usually from 1 
to 2 days before the event to 1 to 2 days following the event), and whether any abnormal 
returns can be explained by other factors in the event window, where the researcher must 
choose a date that is not contaminated by other events that might skew the returns 
(Reynolds, 2008). 
Grace, et al., (1995) examined the impact on shareholder wealth as a result of the 
passage of California’s Proposition 103 in which California voters sought to limit 
property-liability insurance rates in the automobile insurance industry. The researchers 
found that the passage of Proposition 103 had little impact on the value of the insurance 
industry (Grace, et al. 1995).  The authors used the contagion effect hypothesis, the new 
information effect hypothesis, and the dribs and drabs hypothesis (Cornell & Shapiro, 
1986) to learn if the passage of the proposition had any adverse effect on insurance firms 
with exposure to the California market.  
The contagion effect hypothesis, brought to light by Aharony and Swary (1983; 
1996) in their study of bank failures, was used in the Grace, et al. (1995) study to 
ascertain if the passage of the proposition had an adverse effect on insurance companies 
that did not have exposure to the California market, hence the term “contagion.” 
The Dribs and Drabs Theory 
The dribs and drabs hypothesis, otherwise known as the information leakage 
theory, is based on the notion that some events are at least partially anticipated and that 
information is released gradually over extended lengths of time and that no single event 
date can be defined (Grace, et al., 1995).  In short, the dribs and drabs hypothesis is the 
idea that information leaks slowly over time rather than abruptly into the stock market.  
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This theory ties into Thomas’ (1999) statement about securitizations not being carried out 
“on an underwritten basis, but rather on a book-building basis,” (p. 328), inferring that it 
takes weeks for a securitization deal to be constructed by the parties involved in the 
transaction and the market is aware of this process well in advance of the actual 
announcement date of a successful securitization deal.  Thomas (1999), therefore, used a 
longer event window in his study of securitization deals announced by financial 
institutions, -50 days prior to the announcement (or issue) date, to +1 after the 
announcement (or issue) date.   
Bruner and Simms (1987),  and Fields, Ghosh, Kidwell, and Klein (1990), have 
analyzed this concept by testing banking and insurance-specific legislative regulatory 
changes, as previously mentioned with California’s Proposition 103.  Impson and 
Conover (2011) explain that under the dribs and drabs theory, information is leaked into 
the market on a gradual basis, and no single date of any single occurrence can be 
measured.  The authors postulate that although the market reacts quickly and efficiently 
to relevant information that is “dribbled” into the market, such information arrives to 
slowly to the market to be able to be detected in a single event day, but quick enough to 
show an overall response at the cumulative level (Impson & Conover, 2011). 
Amromin, Harrison and Sharpe (2008) examined the effect of the 2003 Dividend 
Tax Cut on U.S. stock indexes, and found, with one exception, that overall, the tax cut 
had no positive, excess return effect on the market.  The one exception was an event 
window (May 14 – 28 of 2003) where high-dividend corporations received an excess 
return (Amromin, Harrison & Sharpe, 2008).  This study also noted the cluster of events 
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that take place in the legislative process, and difficult it can be to identify a distinct event 
date that would indicate either a negative or positive abnormal return.  
In keeping with the dribs and drabs hypothesis, Millon-Cornett and Tehranian 
(1988) examined the effect of a series of announcements that took place leading to the 
passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.  
They studied large and small banks in addition to large and small savings and loan 
institutions.  Their findings, using event study methodology, were that the shareholders of 
large banks experienced increased abnormal returns during the initial proposal of the act 
and the actual passage of the Act by the House of Representatives. Conversely, the 
shareholders of small banks and savings and loan institutions experienced significant 
negative abnormal returns during the same events. These two examples with varying 
results demonstrate that results can vary widely by industry and situation. 
The New Information Theory 
The new information theory, generally given credit to Fama, Fisher, Jensen and 
Roll (1969), states that event dates are the dates that new information is released to the 
markets.  In other words, in the context of the passage of a new piece of legislation, the 
legislative event dates are the dates that uncertainty becomes resolved.  As a result, the 
stock market response on days that new information is released to the market should 
result in overall prices that are significantly different from the prices before or after the 
event if the information is important enough to affect prices. The information effect 
hypothesis is part of the efficient market hypothesis which postulates that any new 
information will expediently and accurately be incorporated into the market (stock prices) 
(Grace, et al., 1995).   
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Tabak & Dunbar (2001) list four components that are most useful when 
evaluating the effects of what constitutes “new information” on stock or security prices: 
 There is a well-defined disclosure to the public,  
 The time that the new information reaches the market is defined, 
 There is no reason to suspect that the market had prior knowledge of the new 
information, 
 It is possible to keep separate or quarantine the effect of the specific new 
information from the market which otherwise might affect the issuer’s security 
price, 
Mamun, Hassan, Karels, and Maroney (2005) studied the effect on shareholder 
wealth as a result of the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 
and used the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model in their event study to find 
that indeed the passage of the Act benefited the shareholders of the insurance companies 
examined in their study.  Moore and Schmit (1989) examined the impact on shareholder 
wealth of insurance firms as a result of the passage of the Risk Retention Act of 1986 and 
found that although there was weak evidence of stock value enhancement by the 
announcement of the passage of the Act, there was no significant impact on average 
returns for the insurance firms used in the sample.  
Ghani and Childs (1999) followed the impact of the passage of the Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act of 1990 for what they term “large U.S. multinational food 
corporations” (p. 1).  The authors studied four specific event dates during the legislative 
process of the passing the Act and found that shareholders of the major food corporations 
experienced significant negative abnormal returns surrounding all four event dates.  The 
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authors believe that the negative wealth effects were based on a perception that the act 
would have affected production costs of the firms involved in the study and the firms’ 
ability to remain competitive in the long term (Ghiani & Childs, 1999). This showed that 
the increased expenses and costs of labeling food products were making an impact on the 
minds of investors in these firms.    
Kwansa (1994) conducted an event study on the traditional lodging sector looking 
for the impact of acquisitions of the target firm’s shareholder wealth from 1980 to 1990. 
The author found that shareholder wealth of the target hotel firms (hotels that were the 
“target” of an acquisition, be it merger or hostile takeover, by another company) in 
acquisition deals was consistent with earlier studies that examined non-hospitality firms.  
It was found that cumulative abnormal returns were significantly higher between days -2 
and +1 of the event window for the target firms, thus the shareholders of target firms 
realized a financial benefit from the acquisition of their company. Kwansa’s findings 
were consistent with similar studies that examined the impact on shareholder wealth of 
takeovers and mergers in non-lodging industries (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989).  
Cornell and Shapiro (1986) analyzed Latin America’s debt crisis of 1982 – 1983 
and how it affected stocks in the United States banking sector.  They employed a cross-
sectional regression analysis in the event study methodology because so many event dates 
were observable across those two years that it rendered a traditional single-date event 
study ineffective.  They found that foreign loan exposure of United States banks did 
indeed have a significant negative impact on the value of United States bank stocks 
during the years of the Latin American debt crisis (Cornell & Shapiro, 1986).  
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Event Study Procedure 
An event study attempts to examine the pricing behavior for a sample of 
companies that have experienced a specific event, which might have occurred at a 
specific time or may have occurred over several points in time around a particular 
calendar date (or “clustered”).  Bowman (1983) explains the basic procedural steps in 
conducting a proper event study: 
1. Identify the event of interest.  The events of interest for this study will be the 
three dates that pertain to the passing of the Timeshare Resale Accountability 
Act by the Florida State Legislature (March 9, 2012), the date the Act was 
signed into law by the Florida governor (June 22, 2012), and the date the Act 
became enforced as law (July 1, 2012).  In terms of the securitization 
announcements of the various timeshare businesses, see the Timeshare 
Securitizations Event Study section later in this paper. 
2. Model the security price reaction.  The model is defined as the method by 
which expected returns are calculated, and for this study, two modes of event 
study analysis will be used, the Fama French Time Series Model and the basic 
event study using the Patell Z statistic (Patell, 1976), Portfolio time-series 
CDA (Crude Dependence Adjustment) statistic, the jackknife statistic (Tukey, 
1958) and the standardized cross-sectional statistic.  In addition, because of 
the relative small samples used in this study, the Bootstrap resampling method 
(Efron, 1979) will be used to allow the results to be more comprehensive.  The 
Fama French model is used as it measures the difference in returns between 
large and small corporate portfolios, as well as measures the difference 
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between returns on corporate portfolios that have low and high book to market 
ratios. 
3. Estimate the excess returns.  The excess returns, or abnormal returns, are 
calculated using one of many methods available, including the market model, 
arbitrage pricing model (Ross, 1976), the unadjusted means model and the 
mean adjusted model, which defines the expected return as the mean of past 
security returns over a given period (Bowman, 1983).  This paper will use the 
market model, as it is accepted by researchers as a more complex and refined 
means of determining an estimate of expected returns (Wells, 2004). The 
market model also uses a risk-adjustment factor in the calculation of estimated 
or expected returns, and is thus considered to have a higher level of 
sophistication than other estimation models (Wells, 2004).  
4. Organize and group the excess returns.  A standard practice is to use 
accumulated abnormal (excess) returns over time.  One aggregation model, 
developed by Jama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), is called the Cumulative 
Average Residual (CAR), or sometimes mean CAR.  This model is thus: 
 
 
Where,  
eit = excess return for firm I in period t 
N = number of firms in the portfolio 
T = number of time periods being aggregated 
             T 
 CARt = ∑  1/N ∑ eit 
                    t=1             i=1 
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5. Analyze the results.  Statistical tests of significance structured for a hypothesis 
that is null.  
The model of a typical event study (Kothari & Warner, 2004) is shown below, 
The return on the shares of company i over time period t is relative to the event Rit   
 Rit = Kit + eit 
 
Where, 
 
Kit = the expected return (or normal, predicted return) 
eit = the difference between the predicted return and the observed return 
Abnormal returns, or excess returns, for a specific stock or security for a given 
period is calculated by the difference between the observed return for that stock for that 
period and the likewise expected (or predicted) return for the same period (Peterson, 
1989).  From Peterson (1989) the equation to find abnormal returns is: 
ARit = Rit-Rit*  
 
Where,  
ARit = Abnormal security return or prediction error for security i in period t;  
Rit = Return on security i in period t; and  
Rit* = Expected or predicted return on security i in period t.  
For the alternative models, Rit* takes the form of,  
Ordinary Least Squares regression, Rjt* = ai + Bi Rmt  
Mean-adjusted, Rit* = Ri  
Market-adjusted, Rit* = Rmt, where Rmt is the return on the market for day t within the 
event period 
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In order for any abnormal returns to be defined, a set of normal returns, which are 
the expected returns that are unconditional of any specific event but are conditional on 
other information, must be specified (Kothari & Warner, 2004).  There are several 
models that can be used to show expected returns.  The three primary models are the 
market model, capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and the constant expected returns 
model (Kothari & Warner, 2004).  As stated earlier, this paper will utilize the market 
model.   
In a typical event study, the focus is usually on the mean of the abnormal return 
distribution, and a typical null hypothesis would be to determine whether the mean 
abnormal return at a specific time (t) is equal to zero (Kothari & Warner, 2004).   
 Peterson (1989) states that the basic premise of an event study is to assess whether 
abnormal returns are shown by securities that are the result of specific corporate or 
industry-wide event or events.  Such events may include mergers and acquisitions, 
changes in senior management of an organization, announcement of a stock split, 
earnings announcements, changes in regulation that affects an entire industry, or a natural 
disaster that has affected a specific industry, among many other events.   
 Fama, et al. (1969) suggested the use of the ordinary least squares model (OLS), 
where the return on any given security (denoted “i”) is regressed against the concurrent 
returns of the market.  Their equation is: 
Rij = αi + βi Rmj + µij     for j = 1, 2 … T 
 
Where, 
 
Rij = Return on security I for period j 
Rm= Return on market index for period j 
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αi  = Intercept 
βi  = Slope coefficient 
µij = Disturbance term 
T  = Number of periods in the estimation period 
To carry out an event study, a model of expected (or normal) returns needs to be 
defined before any abnormal return can be found (Kothari & Warner, 2004).  From a 
variety of models available, which include the capital asset pricing model, the mean 
adjusted model, the marketing adjusted model (as previously mentioned) and the market 
model, this study will use the market model as the model of expected returns.  The 
equation for utilizing the market model approach (Ababneh & Tang, 2013) is: 
Rit = αi + βi + Rmt + Uit 
 
Where, 
 
Rit = the return on individual stock (i) on day t 
Rmt = the return to a broad stock market index on day t 
Uit = a zero-mean distributed error with a standard deviation of σu 
α and β are firm-specific parameters that are estimated using firm returns 
during an ‘estimation’ window (Reynolds, 2008) 
αi = the regression model intercept for firm i 
βi = the market model parameter for firm i  
To calculate normal, or expected, return on day t for stock i, 
 
  E[Rit] = αi + βi + Rmt 
 
This allows for the calculation of the risk-adjusted, or abnormal, return on day t for firm i 
(Ababneh & Tang, 2013), 
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   Ait = Rit - E[Rit] 
 
To yield, 
   Rit - αi - βiRmt 
 
The market model is based on the assumption that a linear relationship exists 
between the return of the market and an individual stock’s return (Reynolds, 2008).  
Pettengill and Clark (2001) question the accuracy of the market model when using 
the model for long-horizon event studies, as they studied the return of securities when 
investment professionals recommended securities for the investing public.  Wells (2004) 
explained that critics of the market model point out that the model relies on an estimate of 
a particular stock’s beta, and that beta is usually estimated over a longer period of time, 
being 12 consecutive months or so, either before or after the event.  Therein lays the 
problem—an assumption must be made that the beta is constant and past performance of 
a stock is a “perfect predictor” of the future (Wells, 2004, p. 66).  
When testing for market reactions to organizational events, it is necessary to test 
for statistical significance of abnormal returns (Peterson, 1985).  For this analysis to be 
successful, abnormal returns need to be standardized in order to reflect any statistical 
error in the analysis of the expected returns.  These are used as a benchmark against the 
abnormal returns brought forth by the event in question.  Peterson (1985, p. 43) describes 
three ways that abnormal stock returns can be standardized.   
First, standardization of an individual security’s return in period t by the standard 
error or standard error of the forecast of that security’s mean return in the estimation 
period can be calculated.  Second, an adjustment of abnormal returns by the standard 
error of the security return deviation from predicted returns in the estimation period for 
all securities in the sample and for all periods within the estimation period can be 
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calculated.  Finally, standardization of an individual security’s abnormal return by the 
sample cross sectional standard error for period t in the event period can be calculated. 
Because the firms that will be used in this study are mixed in terms of the firm 
being a traditional lodging corporation with a vacation ownership operation (Wyndham, 
WYN) and firms that are exclusively vacation ownership (Marriott’s Vacation Club, 
VAC), the Fama-French Model will be used to assist in controlling for the following 
factors: 
• Firm Size (growth stock or value stock) 
• Book-to-Market Ratios 
• Past Returns  
• Small cap stocks' returns over large cap stocks 
• Value stocks’ returns over growth stocks  
In addition, a basic event study will be completed that will not include the Fama-
French Time Series Model, instead using the Patell Z statistic, as it is widely accepted as 
a test that is well-suited for testing the null hypothesis of abnormal returns that are zero 
(Campbell, Cowan & Salotti, 2010).  Two event studies using these two different 
methods of benchmarks will be conducted for the securitization announcement study. 
Florida’s Timeshare Resale Accountability Act 
This study will utilize the daily stock returns of the vacation ownership firms’, as 
daily stock prices allow for more precise measurement of abnormal returns (Kothari & 
Warner, 2004).  This will translate into a more focused understanding of a given 
announcement’s effect on the stock price.  
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In addition, this study will focus exclusively on the short-horizon event study 
window, as a significant amount of literature has determined inherent problems 
encountered with long-horizon event study methods (Brown & Warner, 1980; Kothari & 
Warner, 1997; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999).  According to Kothari & Warner (2004, p. 
9), “we can have more confidence and put weight on the results of short-horizon tests 
than long-horizon tests.” 
The event window should be as short as possible around the actual event, so as to try 
to eliminate any other factors that might influence stock returns (Boehmer, Broussard, 
and Kallunki, 2002).  Brown and Warner (1985) illustrated that the use of a long event 
window reduces the of the test statistic, which may lead to incorrect inferences about a 
particular event’s significance.  The nature of the legislative process, however, is long 
and drawn-out.  There are 114 calendar days between the date that the Act passed the 
Florida State House of Representatives and the date the Act become enforced law.  
Accordingly, for this study, two event windows will be used: 1) from one day before the 
event date (-1) to one day post-event (+1), and 2) from the day of the event (day 0) to one 
day post event (+1).  These event windows will be based around these specified events: 
• Passage of Act by Florida Legislature – March 9, 2012 
• Date Florida Governor Scott signed Act – June 22, 2012  
• Date Act became enforceable law – July 1, 2012 
The questions that this paper will address in terms of the Florida law being enacted 
are contained in the following hypotheses, 
• Null Hypothesis H1a, there is no significant difference in the size of the mean 
cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
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companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon 
announcement of the passage of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act by the 
Florida House of Representatives on March 9, 2012. 
• Null Hypothesis H1b, there is no significant difference in the size of the mean 
cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon 
announcement of the signing of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act by 
Florida Governor Scott on June 22, 2012. 
• Null Hypothesis H1c, there is no significant difference in the size of the mean 
cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon 
announcement of the day of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act became 
state law in Florida on July 1, 2012. 
The event estimation window, the period from which expected returns are calculated, 
for the day that the Act passed the Florida State Legislature will start 51 trading days 
prior to the passage of the Act, 51 trading days prior to the signing into law of the Act by 
Governor Scott, and finally, 51 trading days prior to the date that the law was first 
enforced. Boehmer, Broussard, and Kallunki (2002), note that the estimation period could 
start well over 200 trading days prior to the event. The length of the estimation windows 
for this paper will be a minimum of 30 days to a maximum of 255 days, and will begin 51 
days prior to any event listed in this study.   
The following is a list of what once was all of the timeshare companies, or lodging 
companies that had timeshare businesses, that are or were publicly traded at one point in 
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time.  Since the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act was passed in 2012, some of these 
firms are no longer going concerns or have been acquired by other firms, both privately 
held and publicly traded.  
• BlueGreen (BXG) (now part of BFC Financial), 
• Diamond Resorts International (DRII), 
• Disney (DIS), 
• Hilton (HLT), 
• Hyatt Vacation Ownership (HVO), 
• Interval Leisure Group (IILG) – purchased the privately held Vacation 
Resorts International and purchased Hyatt Vacation Ownership in 2014, 
• Intrawest Holdings (SNOW), 
• Marriott Vacations Worldwide (VAC), 
• Silverleaf Resorts (SVLF) acquired in 2011 by hedge fund, 
• Starwood (HOT), 
• Vail Resorts, Inc. (MTN), 
• Vistana (VSTN) sold to Starwood, and 
• Wyndham (WYN) 
Below is the actual list of corporations that will be used in the sample to gather 
expected returns and abnormal returns.  Securities data from CRSP will be used for the 
following stocks (all of which are lodging firms that have a timeshare business or are 
exclusively timeshare, such as the case with Diamond Resorts and Marriott Vacations 
Worldwide): 
• Diamond Resorts International (DRII), 
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• Disney (DIS), 
• Hilton (HLT), 
• Hyatt Vacation Ownership (HVO), 
• Intrawest Holdings (SNOW), 
• Marriott Vacations Worldwide (VAC), 
• Starwood (HOT), 
• Vail Resorts, Inc. (MTN), and 
• Wyndham (WYN) 
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), published by the University of 
Chicago, will be utilized to retrieve stock price histories for the firms listed above.  
Disney will not be included as it is a global conglomerate and its primary business is 
entertainment, not lodging.   
Securitization Announcements 
The questions this paper will address in terms of the securitization announcements 
made by hospitality companies with timeshare operations are contained in the following 
hypotheses, 
• Null Hypothesis H2a, there is no significant difference in the size of the mean 
cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests, upon 
announcement of a successful securitization transaction, or issuance.  
As stated in the event study involving the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act, the 
group of lodging firms that this study utilizes are listed below, as these firms were going 
concerns at the time of many securitization announcements were made (previous to 
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2011).  Again, the American Resort Development Association is consulted to identify 
appropriate lodging companies which include: 
• BlueGreen (BXG) (now part of BFC Financial), 
• Diamond Resorts International (DRII), 
• Disney (DIS), 
• Hilton (HLT), 
• Hyatt Hotels Corp. (H), 
• Interval Leisure Group (IILG) –purchased the privately held Vacation 
Resorts International, 
• Intrawest Holdings (SNOW), 
• Marriott Vacations Worldwide (VAC), 
• Silverleaf Resorts (SVLF) acquired in 2011 by hedge fund, 
• Starwood (HOT), 
• Vail Resorts, Inc. (MTN), 
• Vistana (VSTN) sold to Starwood, and 
• Wyndham (WYN) 
Table 1 shows the event dates of the announcements of the successful closing of 
various securitizations, the companies that issued them, and the amount of the 
securitizations.  Note that Bluegreen Vacations has two stock symbols as a result of the 
firm being sold to BFC Financial Group in April of 2013.  As a result, the securitization 
that Bluegreen issued on 1/15/2015 is under the BFC Financial banner.  Elara is a resort 
located in Las Vegas, Nevada, and is part of the Hilton Grand Vacations portfolio of 
vacation ownership properties in the U.S.   
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Marriott Vacation Club operates as a “pure play” vacation ownership entity, having 
been spun-off from its former parent corporation, Marriott International.  The sample is 
composed of the following vacation ownership corporations and their corresponding 
securitization issues, listed in Table 1below.  
 
Table 1 
Major Timeshare Securitization Transactions 2004-2015 
 
Date of
Securitization Amount
Company Announcement $ millions
Bluegreen Vacations 1/15/2015 117.8
Bluegreen Vacations 9/13/2012 100.0
Bluegreen Vacations 7/15/2004 156.6
Diamond Resorts International 11/20/2014 260.0
Diamond Resorts International 11/20/2013 226.0
Diamond Resorts International 1/25/2013 93.6
Diamond Resorts International 10/20/2009 182.0
Elara (Hilton Grand Vacations) 11/24/2014 120.0
Marriott Vacation Club 10/10/2014 250.0
Marriott Vacation Club 8/9/2013 263.0
Marriott Vacation Club 7/3/2012 250.0
Silverleaf Resorts 9/12/2012 175.0
Silverleaf Resorts 6/8/2010 151.5
Silverleaf Resorts 4/13/2010 100.0
Starwood Vacation Ownership 11/3/2011 200.0
Starwood Vacation Ownership 12/10/2009 166.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 3/27/2015 350.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 11/5/2014 325.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 7/16/2014 350.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 3/19/2014 425.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 3/21/2013 300.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 3/21/2012 450.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 11/11/2011 300.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 3/28/2011 400.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 7/26/2010 350.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 3/19/2010 300.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 10/7/2009 300.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 5/28/2009 225.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 6/30/2008 450.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 5/1/2008 200.0
Wyndham Vacation Ownership 5/23/2007 600.0
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Successful completion, or closing, of securitization deals announced in the Wall 
Street Journal will be the source of the dates of the securitization announcements, as well 
as each lodging/timeshare firm’s annual reports or press releases.  
To help account for what will be a relatively small sample size in this study, a 
‘Bootstrap’ test (Efron, 1979) will be performed, as many of the assumptions concerning 
normality of distributions may not be valid because of the size of the sample.  
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggest using such a technique when a small sample is 
utilized because the Bootstrap method does not require assumptions of normality.  Daily 
average abnormal returns for the sample of lodging firms with timeshare operations will 
be taken over the 255-day estimation window to reach a number of sets of daily 
abnormal, or excess, returns from which to draw a return.   
 When leakage of information is likely, as with events surrounding the lengthy 
legislative process, it may be prudent to make the event window longer as to capture 
returns associated with the information leakages, but because of the difficulty of 
accounting for confounding effects, the event window should be as short as possible 
(McWilliams & Seigel, 1997).  The event window for this study will be as short as 
possible to eliminate as many confounding effects as possible.   
 Thomas (1999) notes that because securitizations are not underwritten, that they 
are completed through a book-building process, in which the financial institution, usually 
an investment bank, structures the securitization based on market demand and rating 
agency approval, among other factors.  As a result, the market is aware of any 
securitization issuance well beforehand of the actual date of issuance.  Thomas (1999) 
therefore uses a long event window that is subdivided into units of ten day periods, such 
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as 50 to 41days before the securitization announcement, 40 - 31 days before the 
announcement, and so on until the day before the announcement, which is day -1, and an 
all-encompassing event window of 50 days before the announcement date (-50) to one 
day (+1) post announcement, for an event window represented by (-50, +1).  
The parameters of the estimation period, which is the period where the expected 
or normal return is estimated, were set at a minimum of thirty days not exceeding 255 
days.  This estimation period was set at 51 days before (-51) the event window and 
contained security price information for each trading day prior to the event window for 
30 days up to 255 days, depending on firm-specific details such as a firm being privately 
held during the estimation window.   
Parametric tests will be utilized, most notably the Patell Z statistic (Patell, 1976), 
the portfolio time-series crude dependence adjustment t statistic, and the standardized 
cross-sectional test, introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991).  
For the purposes of these event studies, it is assumed that the market is by and 
large efficient in its ability to incorporate new information into the price of common 
stocks (Ball & Brown, 1968; Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969).  
Limitations of Event Studies 
 Wells (2004) showed that when a sample size is small, the statistical analysis may 
be less powerful, and if other factors that occur in a specific industry could obscure the 
results.  In addition, Wells points out in the same study that the event study methodology 
makes an assumption that a sample’s returns are independent of each other, and this 
assumption would most likely be violated if a study examines a specific industry.  
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Binder (1998) points out four distinct problems associated with abnormal return 
estimators in that they: 
1. are cross-sectionally correlated in the event time period 
2. contain different variances across firms 
3. may not be independent in the event time period 
4. may have greater variance during the event period when compared to the 
surrounding periods of time (before and after the event date(s)) 
King (1966) illustrated that the residuals in market model calculations are 
contemporaneously correlated for firms that are in related industries in his study of 63 
stocks and examining their monthly differences “in the logarithm of price” (p. 142) for a 
period of 403 months.   
Wells (2004) points out that when events occur that effect entire industries, violation 
of the assumption that firm returns occur independently of each other may occur.  When 
events that affect an entire industry take place, the event dates are the same for each firm, 
and returns may be contaminated by other firm-specific events that act as confounding 
events in the event windows themselves. In addition, Wells (2004) points out that in 
smaller samples sizes, the returns of only a few companies may have an adverse effect on 
the conclusions of a study.  
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Chapter Four 
RESULTS 
Introduction 
This section will be divided between the two event studies that are the focus of 
this paper, 1) the effect of securitization announcements on shareholder wealth of 
vacation ownership corporations, and 2) the effect of the passage of the Timeshare Resale 
Accountability Act of 2012 in Florida, on shareholder wealth of vacation ownership 
corporations.  We start with the event study conducted on the securitization 
announcements of vacation ownership firms. 
Event Study of Securitization Announcements of Timeshare Firms 
The sample for this study was composed of the vacation ownership corporations 
and their corresponding securitization issues.  Table 1 in the Methodology Chapter 
illustrates the firm, date of announcement of completion of the securitization deal itself, 
and the amount of the securitization.   
 This event study examines the change in the mean abnormal return in securities 
for the vacation ownership firms listed.  The securities data, which is daily common stock 
price, were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices, or CRSP, at the 
University of Chicago, from July 15, 2004 to March 27, 2015.  The calculation of the 
mean abnormal returns for the companies was carried out by the Eventus software 
package from Wharton Research Data Services of the Wharton School at the University 
of Pennsylvania.   
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The average amount of the securitizations examined is $262.44 million, with the 
smallest amount issued by Diamond Resorts, at $93.6 million, and the largest amount 
issued by Wyndham Vacation Ownership, at $600 million.  
In terms of the frequency of securitizations per company, Wyndham by far 
executed the most securitization deals with fifteen securitizations.  Diamond Resorts 
International had the second most securitizations, at four, followed by Marriot Vacation 
Club, Silverleaf Resorts, and Bluegreen Vacations, each having three securitization 
issues, and finally Hilton’s Elara Resort, with one securitization issue.   
It is important to note that Diamond Resorts International, Silverleaf Resorts, and 
Bluegreen Resorts had securitization issuances that were not counted in the final sample 
because the firms were privately held at specific times of securitization announcements, 
thus no security data was publicly available.  Among these firms, five event dates were 
discarded.  Hence, the sample size for this study is twenty-six.  Other vacation ownership 
firms that are privately held also partake in securitization issuances as well, such as 
Westgate Resorts, Orange Lake, and Welk, but are not part of this study because these 
firms are not publicly traded. 
This study incorporates parameters of event window length as suggested by 
several models of similar event window parameters, particularly those noted by Thomas 
(1999) and Fang and Long (2009).  Also included are parameters of event window 
lengths determined by this author to be useful for the purpose of further ensuring that the 
examination of the stock price fluctuations is comprehensive. 
Using daily stock price returns retrieved from CRSP and utilizing the Eventus 
software package from Wharton Research Data Services at the University of 
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Pennsylvania, the vacation ownership corporations that had securitization transactions in 
excess of $50 million from calendar year 2004 through calendar year 2014 were listed 
along with the corresponding dates of the various securitization announcements.  Two 
sets of event studies were carried out, the first set used as a primary parametric test the 
Patell Z statistic, and the second set used the Fama French Time-Series Model.  The set 
using the Patell Z statistic will be discussed first.    
Basic Event Study Results 
Utilizing the event windows preferred by Thomas (1999) to examine whether the 
market showed interest in the book-building of a securitization process that leads up to 
the actual date of the announcement, the event windows themselves were portioned into 
ten-day increments, as listed in Table 2.  The parameters of this event window were fifty 
to forty-one trading days prior to the event (-50, -41), forty to thirty-one trading days 
prior to the event (-40, -31), thirty to twenty-one trading days prior to the event (-30, -21), 
twenty to eleven trading days prior to the event (-20, -11) and ten trading days to the 
trading day before the event (-10, -1). The event day is the day of the announcement of 
the execution of a securitization issue (day = 0).  This is done to ascertain whether the 
market showed interest in the anticipated securitization deals being composed for the 
various corporations, as these deals are complex financial structures involving multiple 
parties and present greater opportunity for information to become more widely known.  
As information is “leaked” from financial institutions that are involved in structuring the 
typical securitization, the market would become aware if the transaction will be likely to 
come to completion, thus the day of the actual announcement of the securitization issue.  
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A total event window of fifty trading days to the trading day post-event is also included 
(as shown in Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Securitization Announcement Event Windows – Market Model, Value Weighted Index 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), >, etc. 
correspond to $, *, and show the direction and significance of the generalized sign test. 
 
The dribs and drabs hypothesis, or the information leakage theory, posited by 
Grace, Rose & Karafiath (1995), make the case that information is slowly leaked to the 
market over a period of time, instead of an abrupt announcement of an event.  With the 
book-building process of assembling a complex financial transaction as the securitization 
of assets, it is reasonable to conclude that the market may be at least aware of a 
company’s efforts to generate a securitization transaction well in advance of the actual 
date of the securitization issue’s announcement.   
None of the cumulative abnormal returns using the ten-day event windows were 
significant at any level, but all returns were positive.  Event window (-30, -21) showed 
Mean Standardized
Cumulative Cross Portfolio Rank Cross
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Test Jackknife Section
Window N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z Error t
(-50, +1) 26 4.61% 13:13 0.731 0.978 0.932 0.959 0.856 1.147
(-50, -41) 26 0.65% 12:14 0.802 0.793 0.301 1.059 0.911 0.508
(-40, -31) 26 1.02% 9:17 -0.447 -0.434 0.470 0.267 -0.498 0.419
(-30, -21) 26 1.73% 11:15 0.389 0.413 0.797 -0.353 0.237 0.935
(-20, -11) 26 0.76% 16:10 1.374 1.469 0.349 0.866 0.810 0.508
(-10, -1) 26 -1.06% 9:17 -0.906 -1.117 -0.487 -0.595 -0.891 -1.197
(-3, +5) 26 1.49% 15:11 1.429 1.577 0.723 1.635 1.673 $ 1.381
(0, +1) 26 1.51% 16:10 1.587 1.418 1.554 2.110 * 1.685 $ 2.107 *
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the highest mean cumulative abnormal return, at 1.73%, of any of the ten-day periods 
used in the event windows, but as mentioned previously, it was not significant at any 
level. The mean cumulative abnormal return was also calculated for the entire event 
window, (-50, +1), and this return was positive, at 4.61%, but not significant at any level. 
Using the time parameters that Fang and Long (2009) suggested in their study of 
securitization announcements, an additional event window used for this study is three 
trading days prior to the announcement of the issuance of the securitization (-3) to five 
trading days post-event (+5).  This event window (-3, +5) showed a mean cumulative 
abnormal return (MCAR) of 1.49% and did show significance at the 10% level of a two-
tail test using the nonparametric jackknife test z score, which was 1.673. A Bootstrap 
significance test was utilized for this same event window and was significant at the 10% 
level using the time-series crude dependence adjustment (CDA) parametric test with a t 
value of .723 in a two-tail test.  The Bootstrap significance levels are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
Table 3 
Parametric Statistics Repeated with Bootstrap Significance  
Market Model, Value Weighted Index 
 
Note.  The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  
0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap  
of the indicated test. 
 
 
Moving to a more contracted event window, recommended by Ababneh and Tang 
(2013) and Thomas (1999), wherein it is suggested the event window should be as short 
as possible, an event window of day = 0, which is the trading date of the event, through 
the first trading day post-event (day = +1), was employed.  Thomas (1999) used the “plus 
one” day post event window in addition to the ten-day breakout periods.  
Interesting to note was that this event window, (0, +1), showed a mean 
cumulative abnormal return of 1.51% with a rank test z value of 2.110 and was 
significant at the 5% level, and also showed a jackknife z value of 1.685 and was 
significant at the 10% level.  The Patell Z value was 1.587 and not significant at the any 
level, nor was the standardized cross-sectional Z test.  
Mean Standardized
Cumulative Cross Portfolio Cross
Abnormal Sectional Time-Series Section
Window N Return Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Error t
(-50, +1) 26 4.61% 0.731 0.978 0.932 1.147
(-50, -41) 26 0.65% 0.802 0.793 0.301 0.508
(-40, -31) 26 1.02% -0.447 -0.434 0.470 0.419
(-30, -21) 26 1.73% 0.389 0.413 0.797 0.935
(-20, -11) 26 0.76% 1.374 1.469 0.349 0.508
(-10, -1) 26 -1.06% -0.906 -1.117 -0.487 -1.197
(-3, +5) 26 1.49% 1.429 1.577 0.723 $ 1.381
(0, +1) 26 1.51% 1.587 1.418 1.554 *** 2.107 *
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Under the Bootstrap significance test for this event window, (0, +1), the mean 
cumulative abnormal return of 1.51%, was significant at the 0.10% level under the time-
series CDA t test (t = 1.554).  The Patell Z test showed no significance at any level under 
the Bootstrap procedure as well. The daily abnormal returns from day -50 to day +5 are 
depicted in Appendix A.  
The hypothesis concerning the announcement of securitizations of vacation 
ownership corporations is restated here, 
Null Hypothesis H2a, There is no significant difference in the size of the mean 
cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon 
announcement of a successful securitization transaction. 
The primary event windows of (-3, +5) and (0, +1) showed no significance under the 
primary tests, and as a result, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
Fama French Event Study Results 
 Using the identical event windows used in the Patell Z tests in the previous event 
study, this event study was performed employing the Fama French Time Series Model.  
The tests used in this model are the portfolio time-series CDA t value, the sign test, the 
rank test Z statistic, and the jackknife Z statistic.  Bootstrap significance tests were also 
conducted with the primary test the portfolio time-series CDA t test.   
 The ten-day incremental event windows, which are listed as (-50, -41), (-40, -31), 
(-30, -21), (-20, -11), and (-10, -1) demonstrated no significant mean cumulative 
abnormal returns.  The event window (-30, -21) showed the highest cumulative abnormal 
return of 1.37%, but was not significant at any level.  The event window (-20, -11) 
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showed a cumulative abnormal return of .73% and its corresponding sign test was 18:8 
and was significant at the 5% level.  This number denotes that 18 firms showed positive 
cumulative abnormal returns and eight firms showed negative cumulative abnormal 
returns for this particular event window.  These event windows are illustrated in Table 4.   
 
Table 4 
Securitization Announcement Event Windows – Fama French Time-Series Model, Value  
Weighted Index 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01,  
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, < or ), > etc. 
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized sign test. 
 
 
 The nine day event window (-3, +5) showed a mean cumulative abnormal return 
of 1.01% and no tests indicated any level of significance.  Also, the event window from 
day fifty before the event of the announcement through the day after the announcement 
date (-50, +1), showed a mean cumulative abnormal return of 3.30%, but was not 
significant at any level for any test.  
Mean
Cumulative Portfolio Cross
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Section Rank Test Jackknife
Window N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
(-50, +1) 26 3.30% 12:14 0.690 0.928 0.703 0.644
(-50, -41) 26 0.17% 11:15 0.080 0.142 0.909 0.661
(-40, -31) 26 0.60% 9:17 0.284 0.264 0.085 -0.476
(-30, -21) 26 1.37% 12:14 0.650 0.758 -0.688 0.080
(-20, -11) 26 0.73% 18:08 > 0.346 0.451 0.966 0.796
(-10, -1) 26 -0.88% 11:15 -0.419 -0.889 -0.464 -0.648
(-3, +5) 26 1.01% 14:12 0.505 1.033 1.434 1.545
(0, +1) 26 1.32% 17:09 ) 1.411 1.972 * 1.781 $ 1.466
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 The event window (0, +1) showed a mean cumulative abnormal return of 1.32% 
and the corresponding portfolio time-series crude dependence adjustment (CDA) t test 
(1.411) showed significance at the 1% level under the Bootstrap significance test, as 
shown in Table 5.  In addition, this event window also showed a sign test of 17:9, and 
this test was significant at the 10% level.  The rank test z statistic for this event window 
was 1.781 and was significant at the 10% level. The daily abnormal returns from day -50 
to day +5 are depicted in Appendix B.  
As in the event study using the Patell Z test, the hypothesis below is explained 
using the results of the event study using the Fama French Time Series Model, 
Null Hypothesis H2a, There is no significant difference in the size of the mean 
cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon 
announcement of a successful securitization transaction. 
From the results of the (0, +1) event window which showed a mean cumulative abnormal 
return of 1.32%, it had a rank test z statistic of 1.781 which was significant at the 10% 
level.  The corresponding sign test was 17.9 and was significant at the 10% level.  The 
portfolio time-series CDA t test = 1.411 and was significant at the .001 level under the 
Bootstrap test.  These results indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected.  The Bootstrap 
significance levels are depicted in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Parametric Statistics Repeated with Bootstrap Significance Levels 
 
Note. They symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated 
test. 
 
 These results of this event study using the event windows specified above fall 
more in line with the new information theory, generally thought to have been brought 
into the financial literature by Fama, (1965), where new information is released to the 
market on a specific date, and the value of the stock at any given time reflects the value 
of future cash flows of that security (Torchio, 2009).  In this event study, the date of the 
announcement (day 0) plus one and two days post-announcement indicate that the 
announcement of a successful securitization issuance represented new information to the 
market and a significance cumulative abnormal return was demonstrated.   
Event Study Results of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act 
The sample for this study was composed of publicly traded vacation ownership 
corporations and lodging corporations that had vacation ownership subsidiaries or 
business units or operated a vacation ownership business at the time the Timeshare 
Mean
Cumulative Portfolio Cross
Abnormal Time-Series Section
Window N Return (CDA) t Error t
(-50, +1) 26 3.30% 0.690 0.928
(-50, -41) 26 0.17% 0.080 0.142
(-40, -31) 26 0.60% 0.284 0.264
(-30, -21) 26 1.37% 0.650 0.758
(-20, -11) 26 0.73% 0.346 0.451
(-10, -1) 26 -0.88% -0.419 -0.889
(-3, +5) 26 1.01% 0.505 1.033
(0, +1) 26 1.32% 1.411 ** 1.972 *
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Resale Accountability Act was passed by the Florida House, when the governor signed 
the bill into law, and when the law became enforceable. Table 6 illustrates the firms used 
in the sample.  
 
Table 6 
Sample Firms - Florida Timeshare Resale Accountability Act 
      
Bluegreen Corporation     
Hyatt Hotels Corporation     
Marriott Vacations Worldwide     
Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide   
Wyndham Worldwide     
 
 
 This event study examines the change in the mean abnormal return in securities 
for the vacation ownership firms listed.  The securities data, which is daily common stock 
price, were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices, or CRSP, at the 
University of Chicago.  The calculation of the mean abnormal returns for the companies 
was carried out by the Eventus software package from Wharton Research Data Services 
of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.   
The sample was composed of eight vacation ownership corporations, of which 
three were discarded as a result of not meeting specific parameters for the estimation 
window, and/or the event window.  These three firms were Diamond Resorts 
International, Hilton Worldwide Holdings, and Silverleaf Resorts.    
This study incorporates parameters of event window length as suggested by 
several models of similar event window parameters, particularly those noted by Ababneh 
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and Tang (2013) and Reynolds (2008).  Also included are parameters of event window 
length determined by this author to be useful for the purpose of further ensuring that the 
examination of the stock price fluctuations is comprehensive. 
Two sets of event studies using daily stock returns of vacation ownership 
corporations that were publicly traded at the time the Act was being passed into law were 
carried out. The first set used as a primary parametric test called the Patell Z statistic, and 
the second set used the Fama French Time-Series Model.  The set using the Patell Z 
statistic will be discussed first.   
Basic Event Study Results  
 The parameters of the event windows for this study, as suggested by Ababneh and 
Tang (2013), Ghani and Childs (1999), and Reynolds (2008), were one day before the 
event (-1) to one day post event (+1), resulting in the event window (-1, +1), and the day 
of the event (0) to one day post event (+1), resulting in the event window (0, +1). Longer 
event windows could be employed, but at the risk of introducing possible confounding 
events (Ghani & Childs, 1999). 
 The estimation period for this study started fifty-one trading days prior to each 
event window, and reached back 255 trading days prior to the start of the estimation 
period.  The results are arranged by the following event dates, March 9, 2012, June 22, 
2012, and July 1, 2012.  Each event date has the same parameters of estimation window 
and event windows.  We start the discussion of the March 9, 2012 results, as this is the 
date the Florida House of Representatives passed the Act.   
Event Date: March 9, 2012.  The event window of one day pre-event to one day post-
event (-1, +1) resulted in a MCAR of -.04%.  The event window of (0, +1), which is the 
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day of the event date to one day post-event, showed a MCAR of -.02%.  These results are 
illustrated in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 
Market Model, Value Weighted Index using Patell Z and Standardized Cross-Sectional 
Tests- March 9, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, < or ), >, etc. 
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized sign test. 
 
 
Two days of trading after the day of the announcement of the Florida House of 
Representatives passing the Act, which resulted in a significant positive cumulative 
return, may indicate that the market had assumed that the next step in the legislative 
process, the signing of the Act by the Florida Governor would take place.  The individual 
day-two post-announcement (day +2), however, resulted in an abnormal return of 4.69%, 
with a Patell Z statistic of 3.295 which was significant at the .0001 level.  This trading 
day also showed significance at the .001 level under the portfolio time-series CDA t 
value of 3.561.  These results for this particular day are displayed in Appendix C.  
The Bootstrap significance levels test results are displayed in Table 8, and the key 
event windows, (-1, +1) and (0, +1), show no significance at any level and the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns are both negative.   
Mean Standardized
Cumulative Cross Portfolio Rank Cross
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Test Jackknife Section
Window N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z Error t
(-1, +1) 5 -0.04% 3:02 -0.001 -0.002 -0.016 -0.146 1.354 -0.038
(0, +1) 5 -0.02% 2:03 0.312 0.609 -0.012 0.255 1.382 -0.037
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Table 8 
Parametric Statistics Repeated with Bootstrap Significance Levels 
March 9, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated 
test. 
 
 
Because of the negative abnormal return of -.10% on the first day post-event (day 
+1), it is not clear that the market expected the next step of the process to naturally take 
place, and that some other confounding event took place on or around March 13, 2012, 
the second trading day (a Tuesday) after the announcement, which took place the 
preceding Friday. 
Null Hypothesis H1a is restated here: there is no significant difference in the size 
of the mean cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon announcement of 
the passage of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act by the Florida House of 
Representatives.  In light of the analysis discussed above, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. 
Event Date: June 22, 2012.  The event window of one day pre-event to one day 
post-event (-1, +1) resulted in a MCAR of -3.75% and was significant at the 10% level 
Mean Standardized
Cumulative Cross Portfolio
Abnormal Sectional Time-Series
Window N Return Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t
(-1, +1) 5 -0.04% -0.001 -0.002 -0.016
(0, +1) 5 -0.02% 0.312 0.609 -0.012
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under the portfolio time-series CDA t test (t = -1.652).  The event window of (0, +1), 
which is the day of the event date to one day post-event, showed a MCAR of -3.40% and 
was significant at the 5% level under the Patell Z test with a score of -2.032.  The 
standardized cross-section z test (z = -4.274) and the jackknife z test (z = -4.292) were 
both significant at the .10% level.  Interestingly, the MCAR for both event windows is 
negative, and significantly negative for the (0, +1) event window.  The event windows 
are shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9 
Market Model, Value Weighted Index using Patell Z and Standardized Cross-Sectional 
Tests – June 22, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, < or ), > etc. 
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized sign test.  
 
Null Hypothesis H1b is restated here: there is no significant difference in the size 
of the mean cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon announcement of 
the signing of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act by the Florida Governor.  
Although the return is negative, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Mean Standardized
Cumulative Cross Portfolio Rank Cross
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Test Jackknife Section
Window N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z Error t
(-1, +1) 5 -3.75% 1:04 -1.408 -1.604 -1.652 $ -1.122 -1.430 -1.463
(0, +1) 5 -3.40% 0:05 <-2.032 * -4.274 *** -1.837 $ -1.586 -4.292 *** -1.896 $
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Event Date: July 1, 2012.  The event window of one day pre-event to one day post-event 
(-1, +1) resulted in a mean cumulative abnormal return of 2.26% and was significant at 
the 5% level under the Bootstrap test.  The event window of (0, +1), which is the day of 
the event date to one day post-event, showed a mean cumulative abnormal return of 
3.58% and was significant at the 10% level using both the Patell Z statistic (z = 1.826) 
and the standardized cross-section Z statistic (z = 1.879).  The jackknife Z test (z = -
6.086) also was significant at the 10% level.  In addition, this event window showed 
significance at the .10% level under the portfolio time-series CDA t test (t = 1.922) using 
the Bootstrap procedure. The event non-Bootstrap event windows are listed in Table 10.  
 
Table 10 
Market Model, Value Weighted Index using Patell Z and Standardized Cross-Sectional 
Tests- July 1, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  They symbols (, < or ), > correspond 
to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized sign test. 
 
 
 The 10% significance level using the Patell Z score (z = 1.826) and the same 
level of significance under the standardized cross-sectional Z test indicates a weak 
rejection of the null hypothesis, but without significance at the 5% level on at least the 
Mean Standardized
Cumulative Cross Portfolio Rank Cross
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Test Jackknife Section
Window N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z Error t
(-1, +1) 5 2.26% 3:02 0.494 0.542 0.990 0.148 -0.009 1.003
(0, +1) 5 3.58% 3:02 1.826 $ 1.879 $ 1.922 $ 1.425 1.660 $ 1.604
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Patell Z test, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The Bootstrap significance levels are 
listed in Table 11.   
 
Table 11 
Parametric Statistics Repeated with Bootstrap Significance Levels 
July 1, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated 
test. 
 
 
Since the Patell Z statistic is significant only at the 10% level using a two-tail test, it is 
difficult to reject the null hypothesis, stated below:  
Null Hypothesis H1c is restated here: there is no significant difference in the size 
of the mean cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation 
ownership companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon 
announcement of the day of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act became 
state law in Florida, July 1, 2012. In light of the analysis discussed above, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected.   
 
 
Mean Standardized
Cumulative Cross Portfolio
Abnormal Sectional Time-Series
Window N Return Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t
(-1, +1) 5 2.26% 0.494 0.542 0.990 **
(0, +1) 5 3.58% 1.826 $ 1.879 1.922 ***
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Fama French Time Series Model Event Study Results 
Event Date: March 9, 2012. The event window of one day pre-event to one day post-
event (-1, +1) resulted in a mean cumulative abnormal return of -.53% and was 
significant at the 5% level under the portfolio time-series CDA t test (-.237) using the 
Bootstrap procedure.  The event window (0, +1), which is the day of the event date to one 
day post-event, showed a mean cumulative abnormal return of -.29% and was not 
significant at any level. The event windows are listed in Table 12, and the bootstrap 
resample results are listed in Table 13. 
 
Table 12 
Fama-French Time-Series Model, Value Weighted Index 
March 9, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, < or ), >  
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean
Cumulative Portfolio Cross Rank
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Sectional Test Jackknife
Window N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
(-1, +1) 5 -0.53% 2:03 -0.237 -0.807 -0.520 -0.058
(0, +1) 5 -0.29% 2:03 -0.159 -0.522 0.001 0.416
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Table 13 
 
Parametric Statistics Repeated with Bootstrap Significance Levels 
March 9, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated 
test. 
 
 
The primary event window of (0, +1) resulted in a mean cumulative abnormal return of -
0.29% and was not significant at any level.   
Null Hypothesis H1a is restated here: there is no significant difference in the size 
of the mean cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon announcement of 
the passage of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act by the Florida House of 
Representatives. In light of the analysis discussed above, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected.  
Event Date: June 22, 2012.  The event window of one day pre-event to one day post-
event (-1, +1) resulted in a MCAR of -3.97% and was significant at the 5% level under 
the jackknife Z test (z = -2.267).  The event window of (0, +1), which is the day of the 
event date to one day post-event, showed a MCAR of -.3.61% and was significant at the 
.10% level under the jackknife Z test (z = -6.086).  This event window showed no 
significance under the primary test, the portfolio time-series CDA t-test, however, there is 
Mean
Cumulative Portfolio Cross
Abnormal Time-Series Sectional
Window N Return (CDA) t Error t
(-1, +1) 5 -0.53% -0.237 ** -0.807
(0, +1) 5 -0.29% -0.159 -0.522
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significance at the 1% level for both the (-1, +1) and (0, +1) event windows using the 
Bootstrap resampling procedure.  The main Fama French results are listed in Table 14 
and the Bootstrap Fama French results are listed in Table 15. 
 
Table 14 
Fama-French Time-Series Model, Value Weighted Index 
June 22, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, < or ), >  correspond 
to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
Table 15 
Parametric Statistics Repeated with Bootstrap Significance Levels 
June 22, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated 
test. 
 
Mean
Cumulative Portfolio Cross
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Sectional Rank Test Jackknife
Window N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
(-1, +1) 5 -3.97% 1:04 -1.784 $ -2.055 -1.509 -2.267 *
(0, +1) 5 -3.61% 0:05 -1.473 -2.543 -1.890 $ -6.086 ***
Mean
Cumulative Portfolio Cross
Abnormal Time-Series Sectional
Window N Return (CDA) t Error t
(-1, +1) 5 -3.97% -1.784 ** -2.055 $
(0, +1) 5 -3.61% -1.473 ** -2.543 $
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Null Hypothesis H1b is restated here: there is no significant difference in the size 
of the mean cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon announcement of 
the signing of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act by the Florida Governor. In light 
of the analysis discussed above, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
Event Date: July 1, 2012.  The event window of one day pre-event to one day post-event 
(-1, +1) resulted in a mean cumulative abnormal return of 2.00% and was significant at 
the 5% level under the portfolio time-series CDA t test (0.895) using the Bootstrap 
method.  The event window (0, +1) showed a mean cumulative abnormal return of 3.04% 
and was significant at the 10% level using the portfolio time-series CDA t statistic (t = 
1.661).  In addition, this event window showed significance at the .001 level under the 
portfolio time-series CDA t test using the Bootstrap procedure. The event windows are 
listed in Table 16, and the Bootstrap significance levels are listed in Table 17. 
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Table 16 
Fama-French Time-Series Model, Value Weighted Index 
July 1, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, < or ), > correspond to $, 
* and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
Table 17 
Parametric Statistics Repeated with Bootstrap Significance Levels 
July 1, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated 
test. 
 
 
Null Hypothesis H1c is restated here, there is no significant difference in the size 
of the mean cumulative abnormal return, or shareholder wealth, for vacation ownership 
companies or hotel companies with vacation ownership interests upon announcement of 
the day of the Timeshare Resale Accountability Act became state law in Florida. In light 
of the analysis discussed above, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
Mean
Cumulative Portfolio Cross Rank
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Sectional Test Jackknife
Window N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
(-1, +1) 5 2.00% 3:02 0.895 0.867 -0.007 -0.105
(0, +1) 5 3.04% 4:01 1.661 $ 1.549 1.034 1.398
Mean
Cumulative Portfolio Cross
Abnormal Time-Series Sectional
Window N Return (CDA) t Error t
(-1, +1) 5 2.00% 0.895 * 0.872
(0, +1) 5 3.04% 1.661 *** 1.549
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Chapter Five 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
 This focus of this study is divided into two individual parts, 1) the effect on 
shareholder wealth of vacation ownership corporations of the enactment of state-level 
legislation that affects the vacation ownership industry and 2) the effect on shareholder 
wealth of vacation ownership corporations that announce successful asset-backed 
securitization issuances.  This chapter will address each sub-study independently, and is 
organized into the following sections, summary of findings, limitations of the study and 
discussion of future research. 
Summary of Findings 
The Timeshare Resale Accountability Act 
 The aim of this study is to ascertain whether a law specific to the vacation 
ownership industry in Florida had an effect on shareholder wealth of various vacation 
ownership, or timeshare, corporations and traditional hotel corporations that have 
timeshare businesses.   
 Two modes of event study were used in this section.  The first mode is the basic 
event study, using parametric measures such as the Patell Z statistic, the standardized 
cross-sectional statistic, the portfolio time-series crude dependence adjustment statistic, 
as well as the jackknife statistic and also using the Bootstrap resampling procedure 
(Efron, 1979) which is encouraged for use with small sample sizes.   
 The second mode utilizes the Fama French Time Series Model event study, which 
takes into account  a company’s debt-to-equity, book-to-market ratio, size, and earnings-
to-price ratio (Fama & French, 2004).   
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 Three important dates relative to the legislative process were studied, March 9, 
2012, when the Florida House of Representatives passed the bill, June 22, 2012 when 
Florida Governor Scott signed the bill into law, and finally July 1, 2012 when the law 
became enforceable.  The purpose of this particular sub-study is to determine if the 
independent dates of this legislative process had an impact on the shareholder wealth of 
firms that were in the industry that the law was written to help.   
Under the Patell Z statistic (defined in this paper as the basic event study mode), 
the date when the Florida House passed the bill, March 9, 2012, did not have a significant 
positive impact on shareholder wealth, with a mean cumulative abnormal return (MCAR) 
of -0.02% for the event window (0, +1), which represents the day of the announcement 
and one day post-announcement.  In this case, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.   
The next date of interest, June 22, 2012, when the bill was signed into law, 
showed no significant positive impact on shareholder wealth.  The event window (0, +1) 
resulted in a MCAR of -3.40%, with no significance using the Patell Z statistic.  The null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected.   
The date the law became enforced, July 1, 2012, showed a positive mean 
cumulative abnormal return of 3.58% for the event window (0, +1), but the Patell Z 
statistic was significant only at the 10% level, thereby the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.   
All three dates studied in the process of the Act becoming law, using the Patell Z 
statistic as the main determinant of the significance of the MCAR, showed no significant 
impact on shareholder wealth .  This may imply that the Timeshare Resale Accountability 
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Act was not important to the vacation ownership market or the lodging industry as a 
whole.   
 The same three dates and the identical event window (0, +1) were used as the 
primary event window.  The March 9, 2012 date resulted in an MCAR of -0.29% and was 
not significant at any level using any statistic.  The next date, June 22, 2012, resulted in 
an MCAR of -3.61%, but was not significant using the portfolio time-series statistic.   
 The last date, July 1, 2012, showed for its event window a MCAR of 3.04% with 
portfolio time-series significance at 10% using a two-tailed test.  Further analysis using 
the Bootstrap resampling method resulted in a portfolio time-series statistic significant at 
the .10 level.  This result would indicate that the null hypothesis would be rejected.  The 
day the law became enforceable plus one trading day showed a positive, significant 
impact on shareholder wealth of the vacation ownership/lodging firms used in the 
sample.  Because of the use of the Fama-French model in this analysis, the size of the 
firms in relation to each other as competitors might have an impact on the results, as 
shareholder wealth is significantly, positively impacted when the Timeshare Resale 
Accountability Act became enforced.  
Securitization Announcements 
 Two modes of event study were used in this section, just as in the previous sub-
study that dealt with legislation.  The metrics used in this sub-study are identical to those 
of the previous sub-study. The first mode is the basic event study, using the same 
parametric measures such as the Patell Z statistic, the standardized cross-sectional 
statistic, the portfolio time-series crude dependence adjustment statistic, as well as the 
jackknife statistic and also using the Bootstrap resampling procedure.  The second mode 
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uses the Fama French Time Series Model event study.  We start with the results of the 
Patell Z basic event study. 
 The sample used in this study is twenty-six firms, each with at least one 
securitization announcement occurring between the years 2004 and 2015 and are directly 
related to the timeshare, industry.  Some firms in the sample are traditional lodging firms, 
such as Hilton and Wyndham, which also operate substantial timeshare businesses.  Some 
firms are simply timeshare companies, such as Marriott Vacation Club and Diamond 
Resorts, both of which are or have been publicly traded in their own right.   
 The aim of this study is to determine if there is a significant effect on shareholder 
wealth for the firms that announced successful asset-backed securitizations.  The first 
mode, using the aforementioned Patell Z statistic, will be discussed first.  
 This study utilized multiple event windows to test a theory put forth by Thomas 
(1999) specifically dealing with the announcements of securitization transactions in that 
the market becomes aware of the process of a firm that is attempting to issue a 
securitization of assets well in advance of the actual date of the final announcement.  The 
idea being that because so many different actors are involved with these very complex 
financial instruments, information is passed from actor to actor and the market becomes 
aware of the process, called “book building” (Thomas, 1999).   
 Utilizing the event window structure that Thomas (1999) used in his study of 
securitization announcements in the banking industry, this paper uses ten-day event 
windows to test this theory.  This study also uses the event window of three days prior to 
the event day through to the fifth day post-event, for an event window of (-3, +5), as 
suggested by Fang and Long (2009) in their study of securitization announcements of 
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Chinese financial institutions, as well as the event window (0, +1), which is the trading 
day of the announcement through one trading day post-announcement, as recommended 
by Ababneh and Tang (2013).   
 The entire event window suggested by Thomas (1999), being fifty days prior to 
the event date split up into windows of ten trading days each, as well as the window of 
fifty trading days all the way through the day after the event, depicted as (-50, +1), 
resulted in a positive mean cumulative abnormal return of 4.61%, but not significant at 
any level.  The event window (-3, +5) resulted in a mean cumulative abnormal return of 
1.49%, but again, not significant.  The last event window we study, (0, +1), resulted in a 
MCAR of 1.51%.  This was not significant under the primary test, Patell Z.   
 Utilizing the Fama French Model event study, the entire window (-50, +1) 
resulted in a mean cumulative abnormal return of 3.30%, but not significant under the 
primary test, the portfolio time-series CDA t test.  Each ten-day window leading up to the 
event date had no significance at any level. Event window (-3, +5) also returned a 
positive MCAR of 1.01%, but not significant.   
The final event window that was studied, (0, +1) did result in an MCAR of 1.32% 
and was significant at the 1% level using the Bootstrap resampling procedure for the 
portfolio time-series CDA t test.  This would lead to the null hypothesis being rejected. 
Limitations of Study 
 Events that occur that affect an entire industry may play a role in the outcome of 
an event study because of confounding events, which may affect a single stock’s 
performance if the events take place in close proximity to each other.  Other events 
relevant to a company’s stock performance may include merger and acquisition 
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announcements (Morck & Yeung, 1992), dividends announcements, stock split 
announcements (Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, 1969), and earnings announcements 
(Brown & Warner, 1985). Brown and Warner (1985) recommend the use of a short event 
window to reduce the probability of introducing a confounding event into the calculation 
of a stock’s abnormal return. 
 Other events that affect the entire industry or multiple industries may cause 
significant changes in the markets.  Natural disasters, terrorist attacks such as the 
September 11 attacks, and other “meta” events may contaminate any event window or 
estimation window when they occur, even if they do not have anything to do with a 
particular industry (Nageswara & Sreejith, 2014).   
 Other factors that affect entire markets is if a market is in “bull” or “bear”, 
meaning that in a bull market, the stock market in general is realizing mostly positive 
returns.  In a bear market, negative returns are the expectation (Klein & Rosenfield, 
1987).  
 The relative small sample size of the study of the impact of the Timeshare Resale 
Accountability Act makes generalization of the findings difficult.  Also, the firms are in 
the same industry, which may violate the assumption that stock returns in the sample are 
independent of one another (Wells, 2004), as actions taken by one firm may affect the 
stock price of competitor firms. 
Future Research 
 Although this study touches on a state-level law in the state with the most 
timeshare units in the United States, future research could explore other state laws 
concerning real estate, the brokerage of the timeshare units themselves, regulatory 
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environments at the state level, and national marketing campaigns that benefit the 
industry as a whole.   
 Other lines of research could focus on the financial structure of timeshare 
operating unit that is part of a larger, traditional lodging firm, such as Wyndham Vacation 
Ownership is a business unit of Wyndham Worldwide, and Hyatt Vacation Club is part of 
Hyatt Hotels.  “Spin-off” timeshare firms, such as Marriott Vacation Club, should be 
studied as to ascertain whether the decision to spin-off a timeshare business unit into its 
own, publicly traded company is beneficial or detrimental to the parent firm (or former 
parent firm).   
 Research focusing on the securitization frequency among hotel and timeshare 
corporations and how timeshare developers actually raise capital to sustain timeshare 
developments may provide some insight into the industry that many other industries 
already have available.  
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Appendix A 
Securitization Announcement Daily Abnormal Returns – Market Model, Value Weighted 
Index 
 
  
Standardized
Mean Cross Portfolio Rank Cross
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Test Jackknife Section
Days N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z Error t
-50 26 -0.03% 15:11 0.993 1.009 -0.037 1.073 0.759 -0.066
-49 26 -0.17% 14:12 -0.692 -0.754 -0.250 -0.280 -0.675 -0.487
-48 26 0.02% 10:16 -0.036 -0.330 0.033 -0.484 -0.048 0.056
-47 26 -0.17% 9:17 -0.458 -0.801 -0.241 -0.577 -0.543 -0.638
-46 26 0.42% 14:12 0.676 0.758 0.618 1.049 1.097 1.236
-45 26 -0.23% 13:13 -0.248 -0.297 -0.333 0.144 -0.056 -0.483
-44 26 -0.08% 12:14 0.018 0.025 -0.117 0.397 0.593 -0.220
-43 26 0.26% 17:09 ) 0.922 1.473 0.372 1.182 1.194 0.991
-42 26 0.10% 9:17 0.035 0.039 0.151 -0.259 -0.394 0.244
-41 26 0.52% 13:13 1.536 1.507 0.756 1.106 1.494 1.390
-40 26 -0.20% 13:13 -1.033 -1.078 -0.294 -0.591 -0.473 -0.583
-39 26 0.38% 14:12 0.337 0.352 0.558 0.129 0.086 0.581
-38 26 1.04% 18:08 > 2.088 * 2.262 * 1.515 2.082 * 1.796 $ 1.658 $
-37 26 0.29% 13:13 0.158 0.190 0.426 0.289 0.105 0.804
-36 26 -0.56% 12:14 -1.156 -1.013 -0.819 -0.417 -0.867 -1.369
-35 26 0.07% 12:14 0.204 0.446 0.099 0.478 0.284 0.351
-34 26 -0.07% 12:14 -0.059 -0.071 -0.103 -0.160 -0.461 -0.151
-33 26 0.17% 12:14 -0.243 -0.313 0.252 -0.334 -0.648 0.430
-32 26 -0.40% 14:12 -1.009 -0.797 -0.586 0.180 -0.601 -0.795
-31 26 0.30% 9:17 -0.776 -0.895 0.438 -0.812 -0.635 0.462
-30 26 0.60% 16:10 1.795 $ 1.264 0.872 1.316 1.226 1.589
-29 26 0.05% 10:16 0.470 0.373 0.078 -0.399 0.058 0.125
-28 26 0.86% 17:09 ) 2.167 * 1.616 1.252 1.766 $ 1.598 1.935 $
-27 26 -0.22% 8:18 -1.644 -1.217 -0.327 -1.094 -0.799 -0.278
-26 26 0.10% 9:17 0.076 0.081 0.148 -0.448 0.161 0.234
-25 26 0.22% 11:15 -0.076 -0.157 0.320 -0.051 0.193 0.558
-24 26 0.03% 11:15 -0.415 -0.494 0.047 -0.496 -0.649 0.054
-23 26 -0.13% 11:15 0.065 0.076 -0.195 -0.397 -0.660 -0.404
-22 26 -0.23% 10:16 -1.012 -0.982 -0.333 -0.942 -0.489 -0.274
-21 26 0.45% 11:15 -0.044 -0.049 0.658 -0.373 -0.129 0.622
-20 26 1.17% 10:16 0.143 0.100 1.700 $ -0.344 0.178 0.944
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Appendix A 
Securitization Announcement Daily Abnormal Returns – Market Model, Value Weighted 
Index 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), > etc. 
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
 
  
Standardized
Mean Cross Portfolio Rank Cross
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Test Jackknife Section
Days N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z Error t
-19 26 -0.48% 9:17 -0.501 -0.850 -0.705 -0.743 -1.098 -1.454
-18 26 0.52% 18:08 > 1.682 $ 2.739 ** 0.752 2.201 * 2.227 * 1.515
-17 26 -0.20% 14:12 -0.557 -0.656 -0.293 -0.205 -0.865 -0.810
-16 26 0.13% 13:13 1.169 1.049 0.184 0.777 0.711 0.340
-15 26 -0.37% 13:13 0.209 0.146 0.532 -0.312 -0.407 -0.631
-14 26 0.28% 18:08 > 1.853 $ 1.842 $ 0.411 2.001 * 1.746 $ 0.740
-13 26 0.08% 10:16 0.069 0.083 0.117 -0.470 -0.127 0.148
-12 26 0.46% 8:18 -0.639 -0.787 -0.668 -0.776 -0.715 -1.453
-11 26 0.09% 13:13 0.970 1.180 0.136 0.609 0.957 0.308
-10 26 -0.19% 10:16 -0.239 -0.424 -0.274 -0.146 -0.821 -0.609
-9 26 -0.38% 11:15 -0.562 -0.631 -0.554 -0.810 -0.849 -1.058
-8 26 -0.13% 14:12 -0.558 -0.507 -0.190 0.213 -0.264 -0.470
-7 26 0.02% 14:12 0.312 0.402 0.028 0.334 0.125 0.068
-6 26 0.08% 14:12 -0.292 -0.349 0.111 0.354 0.275 0.195
-5 26 0.26% 12:14 -0.094 -0.098 0.379 -0.144 0.249 0.537
-4 26 -0.58% 11:15 -1.444 -2.280 -0.845 -1.590 -1.541 -1.411
-3 26 -0.49% 9:17 -0.805 -1.277 -0.713 -0.812 -1.417 -1.730 $
-2 26 0.61% 15:11 0.723 0.847 0.884 0.897 0.835 1.468
-1 26 -0.25% 11:15 0.007 0.009 -0.365 -0.178 0.152 -0.829
0 26 0.59% 15:11 0.423 0.375 0.863 0.921 0.745 1.040
1 26 0.92% 17:09 ) 1.820 $ 2.140 * 1.335 2.063 * 2.279 * 2.499 *
2 26 0.37% 15:11 1.057 0.952 0.546 0.589 0.854 0.855
3 26 0.04% 15:11 0.274 0.423 0.065 0.692 0.841 0.120
4 26 0.65% 18:08 > 2.645 ** 1.910 $ 0.945 2.333 * 2.170 * 1.954 $
5 26 -0.95% 10:16 -1.827 $ -2.420 * -1.391 -1.600 -2.468 * -1.890 $
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Appendix B 
Securitization Announcement Daily Abnormal Returns – Fama-French Time-Series 
Model, Value Weighted Index 
 
 
Mean Portfolio Cross Rank
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Section Test Jackknife
Days N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
-50 26 0.01% 15:11 0.010 0.016 1.195 0.939
-49 26 -0.24% 13:13 -0.359 -0.640 -0.442 -0.633
-48 26 0.03% 11:15 0.049 0.082 -0.437 -0.198
-47 26 -0.13% 12:14 -0.197 -0.560 -0.375 -0.747
-46 26 0.24% 13:13 0.369 0.756 0.798 0.620
-45 26 -0.05% 12:14 -0.069 -0.102 0.457 0.206
-44 26 -0.17% 14:12 -0.263 -0.398 0.567 0.555
-43 26 0.06% 15:11 0.098 0.231 0.659 0.880
-42 26 -0.04% 11:15 -0.054 -0.086 -0.539 -0.876
-41 26 0.44% 13:13 0.669 1.190 0.991 1.287
-40 26 -0.26% 11:15 -0.387 -0.756 -0.893 -0.607
-39 26 0.22% 14:12 0.331 0.325 0.033 -0.124
-38 26 0.84% 18:08 > 1.269 1.586 1.948 $ 1.720 $
-37 26 0.36% 13:13 0.544 0.996 0.376 0.306
-36 26 -0.47% 12:14 -0.712 -1.105 -0.267 -0.625
-35 26 -0.02% 10:16 -0.029 -0.113 0.095 -0.154
-34 26 -0.20% 11:15 -0.300 -0.456 -0.173 -0.552
-33 26 0.08% 11:15 0.117 0.234 -0.410 -0.556
-32 26 -0.46% 13:13 -0.697 -0.919 0.087 -0.535
-31 26 0.51% 10:16 0.763 0.757 -0.527 -0.330
-30 26 0.39% 15:11 0.591 1.053 0.858 0.989
-29 26 -0.03% 10:16 -0.510 -0.078 -0.383 -0.046
-28 26 0.77% 16:10 1.155 1.687 $ 1.376 1.456
-27 26 -0.09% 8:18 ( -0.133 -0.111 -1.011 -0.768
-26 26 -0.10% 8:18 ( -0.144 -0.235 -0.841 -0.084
-25 26 0.29% 12:14 0.444 0.794 0.315 0.548
-24 26 0.13% 12:14 0.194 0.189 -0.446 -0.567
-23 26 -0.20% 11:15 -0.295 -0.600 -0.487 -0.702
-22 26 -0.15% 11:15 -0.221 -0.179 -0.876 -0.481
-21 26 0.34% 13:13 0.515 0.452 -0.681 -0.297
-20 26 1.03% 9:17 1.556 0.875 -0.687 -0.078
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Appendix B 
Securitization Announcement Daily Abnormal Returns – Fama-French Time-Series 
Model, Value Weighted Index 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), > etc. 
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
 
 
Mean Portfolio Cross Rank
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Section Test Jackknife
Days N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
-19 26 -0.43% 11:15 -0.647 -1.221 -0.423 -0.699
-18 26 0.59% 18:08 > 0.890 4.590 2.341 * 2.254 *
-17 26 -0.35% 13:13 -0.529 -1.317 -0.643 -1.188
-16 26 0.17% 13:13 0.250 0.448 0.821 0.783
-15 26 -0.34% 15:11 -0.517 -0.574 -0.055 -0.278
-14 26 0.43% 18:08 > 0.644 1.109 2.335 * 2.057 *
-13 26 0.00% 12:14 0.003 0.004 -0.383 -0.004
-12 26 -0.46% 9:17 -0.693 -1.381 -0.851 -0.692
-11 26 0.09% 12:14 0.139 0.348 0.634 0.735
-10 26 0.04% 16:10 0.065 0.168 0.434 -0.165
-9 26 -0.40% 12:14 -0.602 -0.976 -0.791 -0.668
-8 26 -0.26% 12:14 -0.394 -0.978 -0.094 -0.472
-7 26 -0.08% 13:13 -0.118 -0.240 -0.063 -0.009
-6 26 -0.04% 14:12 -0.064 -0.099 0.060 -0.104
-5 26 0.45% 13:13 0.673 0.887 0.313 0.557
-4 26 -0.40% 13:13 -0.610 -1.067 -1.022 -1.091
-3 26 -0.38% 10:16 -0.573 -1.367 -0.753 -1.258
-2 26 0.42% 15:11 0.634 1.086 0.679 0.572
-1 26 -0.22% 10:16 -0.336 -0.807 -0.231 0.193
0 26 0.65% 15:11 0.975 1.123 1.008 0.701
1 26 0.68% 15:11 1.019 2.064 * 1.511 1.903 $
2 26 0.22% 12:14 0.331 0.491 0.132 0.589
3 26 -0.03% 15:11 -0.051 -0.087 0.528 0.622
4 26 0.63% 19:07 >> 0.944 1.969 * 2.588 * 2.183 *
5 26 -0.95% 11:15 -1.429 1.898 $ -1.159 -2.121 *
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Appendix C 
Market Model, Value Weighted Index using Patell Z and Standardized Cross-Sectional 
Tests - March 9, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), > etc. 
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized
Mean Cross Portfolio Rank
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Test Jackknife
Days N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z
-5 5 0.08% 2:03 -0.075 -0.173 0.602 0.164 0.391
-4 5 0.40% 4:01 0.889 1.859 $ 0.305 1.007 4.726 ***
-3 5 -0.57% 1:04 -0.441 -2.662 -0.433 -0.614 0.074
-2 5 0.60% 3:02 0.493 1.155 0.457 0.868 0.410
-1 5 -0.01% 1:04 -0.421 -0.503 -0.011 -0.614 0.096
0 5 0.07% 3:02 0.319 1.106 0.056 0.396 1.928 $
1 5 -0.10% 1:04 0.116 0.164 -0.073 -0.035 0.738
2 5 4.69% 4:01 3.295 *** 1.843 $ 3.561 *** 1.660 $ -0.539
3 5 -0.75% 2:03 -1.504 -1.097 -0.574 -0.489 -1.454
4 5 -0.25% 2:03 -0.566 -0.523 -0.192 -0.563 -0.010
5 5 -0.98% 1:04 -0.602 -0.800 -0.747 -0.882 -0.355
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Appendix D 
Market Model, Value Weighted Index using Patell Z and Standardized Cross-Sectional 
Tests – June 22, 2012 Event Date 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), > etc. 
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized
Mean Cross Portfolio
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Rank Test Jackknife
Days N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z
-5 5 -1.38% 1:04 -2.120 * -3.188 ** -1.057 -1.75 $ -3.166 **
-4 5 2.30% 3:02 1.336 0.899 1.754 $ 0.63 0.759
-3 5 0.87% 3:02 1.430 1.642 0.668 1.21 1.515
-2 5 -1.13% 2:03 0.078 0.063 -0.863 0.23 0.181
-1 5 -0.34% 3:02 0.396 0.432 -0.263 0.30 0.743
0 5 -2.17% 1:04 -1.601 -1.659 $ -1.655 $ -1.25 -1.849 $
1 5 -1.23% 1:04 -1.242 -1.179 -0.943 -1.00 -0.989
2 5 0.27% 2:03 0.369 0.830 0.207 0.63 0.607
3 5 -0.09% 1:04 -0.778 -1.267 -0.068 -0.74 -1.334
4 5 -1.31% 0:05 < -1.717 $ -4.228 *** -0.998 -1.75 $ -4.756 ***
5 5 2.39% 4:01 2.277 * 2.134 1.826 $ 1.91 $ 2.506 *
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Appendix E 
 
Market Model, Value Weighted Index using Patell Z and Standardized Cross-Sectional 
Tests – July 1, 2012 Event Date 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, 
and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), > etc. 
correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized
Mean Cross Portfolio Rank
Abnormal Positive Sectional Time-Series Test Jackknife
Days N Return Negative Patell Z Test Z (CDA) t Z Z
-5 5 -2.19% 1:04 -1.587 -1.637 -1.661 $ -1.217 -2.039
-4 5 -1.24% 1:04 -1.274 -1.232 -0.945 -1.010 -0.903
-3 5 0.25% 2:03 0.367 0.819 0.192 0.640 0.743
-2 5 -0.11% 1:04 -0.797 -1.331 -0.082 -0.735 -1.659 $
-1 5 1.32% 0:05 < -1.737 $ -4.260 *** -1.004 -1.760 $ -3.289 **
0 5 2.36% 4:01 2.302 $ 2.106 * 1.797 $ 1.909 $ 2.738 **
1 5 1.21% 2:03 0.258 0.286 0.922 0.107 0.017
2 5 -0.49% 1:04 -0.918 -2.219 * -0.369 -0.859 -2.087 *
3 5 1.29% 5:00 > 1.697 $ 2.366 * 0.982 1.642 3.587 ***
4 5 -0.33% 3:02 -0.370 -0.426 -0.252 0.143 -0.002
5 5 -0.18% 1:04 -1.117 -1.15 -0.134 -0.840 -1.315
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Appendix F 
 
Daily Returns – Fama-French Time-Series Model, Value Weighted Index 
March 9, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05,  
0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), >  
etc. correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Portfolio Cross Rank
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Section Test Jackknife
Days N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
-5 5 0.52% 3:02 0.403 0.749 0.502 1.319
-4 5 0.28% 3:02 0.213 1.054 0.643 1.444
-3 5 -0.72% 0:05 < -0.550 -2.390 -0.876 -2.230 *
-2 5 0.56% 3:02 0.434 1.606 0.761 0.591
-1 5 -0.24% 1:04 -0.185 -0.304 -0.867 -0.267
0 5 -0.24% 2:03 -0.187 -0.652 -0.137 -0.701
1 5 -0.05% 2:03 -0.037 -0.100 0.103 0.655
2 5 4.97% 4:01 3.825 *** 1.310 1.917 $ 1.506
3 5 -0.71% 2:03 -0.548 -0.807 -0.486 -0.918
4 5 -0.18% 2:03 -0.141 -0.200 -0.545 -0.385
5 5 -0.71% 1:04 -0.549 -1.056 -0.677 -0.659
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Appendix G 
 
Daily Returns – Fama-French Time-Series Model, Value Weighted Index 
June 22, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05,  
0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), >  
etc. correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Portfolio Cross Rank
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Section Test Jackknife
Days N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
-5 5 -1.43% 0:05 < -1.112 -4.203 *** -1.892 $ -3.351 ***
-4 5 1.84% 2:03 1.435 1.222 0.509 0.662
-3 5 0.80% 3:02 0.624 1.387 1.128 1.398
-2 5 -1.12% 2:03 -0.868 -0.360 0.258 0.130
-1 5 -0.37% 3:02 -0.284 -0.540 0.053 0.398
0 5 -2.26% 1:04 -1.758 $ -1.381 -1.582 -2.311 *
1 5 -1.35% 1:04 -1.048 -1.449 -1.085 -1.163
2 5 0.33% 2:03 0.254 0.964 0.732 0.918
3 5 0.11% 1:04 0.082 0.099 -0.739 -1.069
4 5 -1.03% 1:04 -0.798 -1.980 * -1.454 -2.867 **
5 5 2.02% 4:01 1.575 2.089 * 1.857 $ 2.296 *
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Appendix H 
 
Daily Returns – Fama-French Time-Series Model, Value Weighted Index 
July 1, 2012 Event Date 
 
 
Note. The symbols $, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05,  
0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a two-tail test.  The symbols (, <, or ), >  
etc. correspond to $, * and show the direction and significance of the generalized test. 
 
 
  
Mean Portfolio Cross Rank
Abnormal Positive Time-Series Section Test Jackknife
Days N Return Negative (CDA) t Error t Z Z
-5 5 -2.27% 1:04 -1.760 $ -1.368 -1.563 -2.364 *
-4 5 -1.34% 1:04 -1.037 -1.484 -1.091 -1.115
-3 5 0.30% 2:03 0.233 0.823 0.729 0.902
-2 5 0.08% 1:04 0.065 0.064 -0.767 -1.314
-1 5 -1.03% 1:04 -0.799 -2.178 * -1.475 -2.670 *
0 5 1.98% 4:01 1.529 2.031 1.845 $ 2.311 *
1 5 1.06% 1:04 0.821 0.561 -0.382 -0.308
2 5 -0.55% 1:04 -0.429 -1.258 -1.050 -2.139 *
3 5 0.63% 4:01 0.489 1.210 1.058 2.274 *
4 5 -0.30% 3:02 -0.022 -0.073 0.312 0.274
5 5 -0.27% 1:04 -0.210 -0.261 -0.818 -1.300
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